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This book is the result of years of reflection. Some time ago, while working in 
commodities, the author felt how difficult it was to decide the order in which to 
use arguments during a negotiation process. What would happen if we trans-
lated the arguments into cards and played them according to the rules of the 
Bridge game? The results were impressive. There was potential for improve-
ment in the negotiation process. The investigation went deeper, exploring play-
ers, cards, deals and the information concealed in the players´ announcements, 
in the cards and in the deals. This new angle brought the research to Neuro-
Linguistic Patterns and cryptic languages, such as Russian Cards.                     
In the following pages, the author shares her discovery of a new application for 
Logical Dialogues: Negotiations, tackled from basic linguistic structures placed 
under a dialogue form as a cognitive system which ‘understands’ natural lan-
guage, with the aim to solve conflicts and even to serve peace. 
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The following book is an edition of College Publications and the Axe 
Transversal Argumentation headed by Shahid Rahman at the University of Lille 
3–Charles-de-Gaulle and in collaboration with the laboratory Savoirs, Textes, 
Langage (Unité Mixte de Recherche 8163, Lille 3).  
  
  Negotiating with a Logical-Linguistic Protocol in a Dialogical Framework is the 
result of years of reflection. Some time ago, while working in commodities, 
the author felt how difficult it was to decide the order in which to use ar-
guments during a negotiation process. What would happen if we translated 
the arguments into cards and played them according to the rules of the 
Bridge game? The results were impressive. There was potential for im-
provement in the negotiation process. The investigation went deeper, ex-
ploring players, cards, deals and the information concealed in the players´ 
announcements, in the cards and in the deals. This new angle brought the 
research to Neuro-Linguistic Patterns and cryptic languages, such as Russian 
Cards. 
 In the following pages, the author shares her discovery of a new applica-
tion for Logical Dialogues: Negotiations, tackled from basic linguistic structures 
placed under a dialogue form as a cognitive system which ‘understands’ nat-
ural language, with the aim to solve conflicts and even to serve peace.
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Foreword 
 
Maria Dolors Martínez-Cazalla is a pioneer. She is a pioneer in negotiation, 
and she shares three traits with the pioneers in navigation: boldness, crea-
tivity and passion.  
 
Boldness. Before focusing on basic linguistic structures, Maria Dolors Mar-
tínez-Cazalla was a business woman. Her experience in this field was cer-
tainly crucial to realize that presenting arguments in a specific order matters. 
Scholars and practitioners involved in negotiation are well aware of the cru-
cial importance of the arguments emphasized by the parties. However, they 
are now asked to go one step further in considering not only the content of 
the arguments, but also their particular sequences. To Maria Dolors Mar-
tínez-Cazalla, the vital question is: in which order should the arguments be 
used and under which syntactic structure should be expressed in order to 
make a difference? To address this question, she translated arguments into 
cards and played them according to the rules of Bridge. Seeing the potential 
of this initial step, she pursued her objective with determination and started 
exploring linguistics and logic in order to test various scenarios. Her path is 
undoubtedly original. In choosing it, Maria Dolors Martínez-Cazalla took 
risks. She can now enter the room of daring scholars.  
 
Creativity. Negotiating with a Logical-Linguistic Protocol in a Dialogical Framework 
is one of the most innovative books devoted to the negotiation process. 
Many writers have explored the underlying factors behind the success or 
failure of negotiations. As early as 1716, François de Callières was studying 
negotiations. His book De la manière de négocier avec les souverains follows in the 
tradition of Machiavelli’s The Prince in the advice it gives readers. But rather 
than reducing negotiations to preparing for war, he describes them also as a 
harbinger of peace. Since then, many handbooks have followed in succes-
sion. These works stress in particular the importance of preparation and the 
formal aspects of negotiation. Questions of status, choice of a particular 
language, setting calendars, mandates, and agendas often condition the re-
sults of a process. Most of these books present negotiating techniques, tac-
tics, and strategies, referring sometimes to standards of rhetoric, argumenta-
tion, and persuasive processes. However, none of them underlined the sig-
nificance of basic linguistic structures as conjunctions, disjunctions, or con-
ditionals.  
In this regard, no one could deny that Maria thought about something un-
thought. The use of the cards metaphor is not radically new. Negotiators 
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and mediators are often compared to players, while their moves, their inter-
actions and their deals are described in terms of games. Nonetheless, only a 
few experts took the metaphor seriously. Game theorists mobilize economic 
theory (for studying comparative costs), and social psychology (analyzing 
cooperative and competitive behavior) for this purpose. They insist on the 
actors’ rationality, and ask fundamental questions about their choices, the 
conditions affecting those choices, and the level of trust between parties. 
This strategic approach is often associated with the study of the prisoner’s 
dilemma that led to the development of a theory of cooperation based on a 
form of “conditional trust” (tit for tat). From this perspective, the most 
compelling long-term strategy is to start by cooperating and in the next 
phase to respond in the same way as the other party.1 Maria Dolors Mar-
tínez-Cazalla’s theory is also based on rationality and calculations. Nonethe-
less, her research question is completely original.  
 
Expert in Logic and specialist in the rules of Bridge, she enlightens three of 
the most important phases of any negotiation process: the preparation 
phase, the information phase and the argumentation phase. The order of the 
arguments can actually be taken into account as soon as the information 
needed to make a diagnosis is gathered (preparation phase). Once the diag-
nosis has been made, the parties generally enter the second major stage de-
signed to develop a jointly agreeable formula that will serve as a referent for 
an agreement. During the information phase, long discussions then strive to 
determine the terms of the exchange. The third phase deals with the details 
of the transaction. This argumentation phase is precisely the moment for 
fine-tuning positions, calibrating concessions, and specifying the terms of 
the exchange leading to the agreement’s finalization. The care taken in each 
of these phases determines to a great extent whether or not the agreement 
reached will be implemented. At each of these phases, the logical-linguistic 
protocol emphasized in this book invites parties to pay attention to the best 
order in which they can use their arguments and to build them under the 
most favorable syntactic structure for them.  
 
Passion. Since our first encounter in 2010, Maria Dolors Martínez-Cazalla 
never stopped working to push boundaries. Far from any kind of repetition, 
her theory raises new questions. And, even though we cannot predict the 
progress of negotiations through her protocol alone, they complete the ma-
jor tools that are available to fully grasp the complexity of negotiation pro-
                                              
1 See Robert Axelrod, The Complexity of Cooperation, Princeton (NJ), Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1997. 
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cesses. There is much at stake. Historians and ethnologists agree that all 
human societies are characterized by negotiation. Certain realities might 
seem to be non-negotiable a priori. Beliefs, values, and identities are rarely 
the result of compromise. They are by nature non-divisible and unlikely to 
be modified by any dealings. Similarly, notions of justice and truth do not 
seem open to bargaining, at least in principle. It is therefore not rare for par-
ties to immediately affirm the non-negotiable nature of certain positions in 
the framework of negotiations that are predominantly conflictual rather than 
cooperative.  
 
Even if the theory of Maria Dolors Martínez-Cazalla is conceived for all 
kinds of negotiation, and not only for diplomatic negotiations, let me illus-
trate my point by a concrete example which has been burning for years now 
on the international scene, namely the peace talks on Syria. In this specific 
case, the removal of Syrian President Bachar Al-Assad was long qualified as 
non-negotiable by representatives of the Syrian opposition. However, the 
length of the conflict, the intervention of foreign powers such as Russia and 
Iran, and leadership changes in third parties (whether in the United States or 
France) seem to have shifted the inviolability of this red line. In the Middle 
East, issues regarding the right of return and holy places have also prompted 
positions presented as non-negotiable. Yet the deadlocks created by these 
problems do not mean there is no imaginable solution. Value conflicts cer-
tainly prove more intense and harder to settle than interest conflicts. But 
one should never rule out a priori that experienced negotiators and/or me-
diators might succeed in turning value conflicts (religious or identity-based 
ones, for instance) into interest conflicts. That being the case, it seems prob-
lematic to present certain subjects as inherently non-negotiable. Certain real-
ities —although presented and perceived as such for decades— may over 
time be subject to transactions, depending on the different actors’ circum-
stances and objectives. The work of Maria Dolors Martínez-Cazalla shows 
us that these variables (circumstances and objectives) are not the only ones 
that deserve to be considered.  
 
Boldness, creativity and passion. These traits allowed Maria Dolors Mar-
tínez-Cazalla to contribute to a better understanding of the subtle art of ne-
gotiation. To some, negotiation is all about power. To others, it is all about 
relationships. A focus on a dialogical framework can help the parties to find 
themselves on the same side of the fence. The exercise might seem risky and 
discouraging —but it is always compelling. Although it can be dizzying, it is 
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no doubt worth remembering that, in the end, “it is all about reaching a 
compromise. A matter of imagination”2.    
 
 
Dr. Valérie Rosoux 
Senior Research Fellow FNRS  
UCLouvain 
valerie.rosoux@uclouvain.be 
 
 
 
                                              
2 Francis Walder, Saint-Germain ou la négociation, Paris, Gallimard, 1992. 
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Even if 
What has been, that will be; what has been done, that will be done.  
Nothing is new under the sun!  
Ecclesiastes 1:94 
There may be other knowledges to acquire, other questions to consider, 
starting, not from that what others have known,  
but from what they have ignored.  
S. Moscovici5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
4 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (2011). 
5 Our translation for: “Puede que actualmente haya otros conocimientos que adquirir, otras 
cuestiones que plantearse, partiendo, no de lo que los demás han conocido, sino de lo que 
han ignorado” S. Moscovici (quoted by Morin, 1986, p. 20). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Negotiating with a Logical–Linguistic Protocol in a Dialogical Framework 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
M. Dolors Martínez-Cazalla   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Even if “nothing is new under the sun”, “there may be other knowl-
edges to acquire, other questions to consider, starting, not from that what 
others have known, but from what they have ignored [emphasis added]”, by 
choice or by chance –that is not relevant; the matter is to think about some-
thing un-thought to this moment. This is the hazardous passion developed 
here, and you are invited to share it.      
 
 Negotiating with a Logical-Linguistic Protocol in a Dialogical Framework is the 
result of years of reflection. Some time ago, while working in commodities, 
we felt how difficult it was to decide the order of arguments6 (arguments un-
derstood as explained in the footnote) used during a negotiation process. As 
in a Bridge game, we translated the arguments into cards and played them 
according to the rules of Bridge, and saw how it worked to deal with them 
as in a Bridge hand. The results were impressive. We were thrilled about the 
potential for improvement in the negotiation process. We decided to inves-
tigate deeper in the possibility to undertake negotiations applying Bridge 
rules to organise the order of arguments. This was the subject of a previous 
work (2011): The Bridge. A bridge toward Negotiations.7 That work was the first 
formal attempt to establish a protocol to know the best order in which to 
use arguments during a negotiation process by converting them into cards 
and playing a Bridge hand. However, as it will be shown later, the study re-
vealed some limitations. This subsequent work is an attempt to reduce these 
limitations. 
 The new work had to be more scientific and precise, so the decision 
was taken to start a research in Logic as the best framework and tool to ad-
dress this subject. Following this path, the idea of turning arguments into 
cards to play a Bridge hand expanded progressively and went one step ahead 
exploring players, cards, deals and the information concealed in the player’s 
announcements and in the cards and/or in the deals. This new angle 
brought the research to Neuro-Linguistic Patterns –NLP– and cryptic lan-
guages, like Russian Cards developed by van Ditmarsch (Van Ditmarsch, van 
der Hoek, & Kooi, 2008, pp. 97-104 et 108).  
                                              
6 We take always the word argument along this work as the conclusion of an inferential pro-
cess. Thus, Argument = Premise/s + Reasoning = Conclusion.  
7 Martínez-Cazalla (2011), Master’s thesis available at the Library of Economic, Social, Politi-
cal Sciences and Communication (BSPO), at the Catholic University of Louvain (UCL). 
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 Finally, this work is an attempt to think how to create logical dialogues 
to tackle negotiations, meaning: solving conflicts from basic linguistic struc-
tures (conjunctions, disjunctions, conditionals) placed under a dialogue form 
as a cognitive system which ‘understands’ natural language and where there 
is a permanent feedback between both. 
 This piece of research aims to show and to share just a path, not a 
conquered territory, toward negotiating in a dialogical framework, and re-
mains always open to any possible refinement. It has been developed like a 
tragedy in three acts. Each act has been a ‘conceptual mimesis’ of the argu-
ments used during the negotiation process to produce a ‘catharsis’, an im-
provement in the negotiation process. The three acts have a spiral form, the 
first one is Bridge, the second is Neuro-Linguistic Patterns and the third is 
the cryptic language Russian Cards. The procedure for this research has been 
to study each part in the sight of its contribution and its limitations. Our 
task has been to address our focus to the limitations, with the aim to reduce 
them at every step. The Conclusion shows only a possible map, a guide to 
choosing the order of arguments and their syntactic structure, as will be ex-
pressed/expounded in negotiations. 
 
 The structure of each act, as a step in this path, will be: 
  1.  A presentation on the appropriateness and accommodation of 
the specific subject in the whole research. 
  2.  Application to prepare negotiations. 
 3.  Lights and shadows, or some interesting considerations to keep   
  in mind for planning negotiations. 
 
 In order to judge our success in establishing a protocol to know the 
best order in which to use arguments during a negotiation process, we need-
ed a testing ground in which to verify our conclusion. This is why we chose 
a completed negotiation case to guarantee an objective application, because 
there is no possibility to change the events The case chosen for study as a 
model for this ‘experiment’ is Camp David Accords. An exhaustive analysis of 
this case is found in the Annex,8 so that the testing ground is available to 
assess this research in terms of right or wrong, because without this docu-
ment the semantic truth would be unknown. To preserve the rigour and the 
aseptic nature of this research, we have not applied any framework suscepti-
ble of being applied later –we will discover its real usefulness throughout the 
research. Thus, you will not find any application of the Game Theory, neither 
NLP nor Dialogical Semantics along this analysis of Camp David Accords. A 
                                              
8 A published presentation by Martínez-Cazalla (2012) about this subject is also available. 
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preliminary research had been carried out on this negotiation, as mentioned 
above. The same study case has been chosen with the purpose to give con-
tinuity to the already started investigation. This was the reason for selecting 
this particular case, and not the idea that this theory is only applicable to cas-
es of international negotiations. This theory is for negotiations, whatever 
they are, regardless of their scope. 
 
 The methodology used here has been the one that is appropriate in 
Logic: many paper reflections, thought drafts –not included here because 
they do not have a decisive character for the final result–; specific sources9 
such as manuals, books, articles and documents about the different subjects 
tackled along this research; and personal reflection comparing the different 
results and information. Working with specific sources, we tried to remain 
as rigorous as possible while opening a new theoretical path into negotiation 
analysis and into the field of applied Logic (one of the difficulties of open-
ing a new path, no matter how fascinating it may be, is that no sources exist 
while it is being built). As you know, the instrumental nature of Logic was 
recognised as early as Aristotle’s Organon. In fact, Logic has been a tool for 
philosophical studies since Aristotle, although many logicians see Logic only 
as a family of formal systems. Logic is not applied to philosophical problems 
in the same way an engineer may apply some techniques. Nevertheless, 
many logical notions transcend the particular formal systems and Logic can 
offer there a rigorous language –with precise meanings– to study philosoph-
ical discourses and discourses in social and human sciences. Besides, it is a 
great help for enhancing precision in communications. As we see, modern 
Logic deals with a wide range of intelligent interactions across academic dis-
ciplines, from humanities to natural sciences. This dynamic turn involves the 
logical Dynamics (dialogues as a form of reasoning, dialogical Logic, Study 
of Knowledge, communication process, etc.). In this sense, van Benthem 
was clever when saying: 
 
Logical Dynamics is a way of doing Logic [emphasis added], but is also a general 
stance. Making actions, events, and procedures first-class citizens enriches 
the ways in which logic interacts with philosophy, and it provides a fresh 
look at many traditional themes. Looking at logic and philosophy over the 
last century, key topics like quantification, knowledge, or conditionality 
have had a natural evolution that went back and forth across disciplines. 
                                              
9 Note that in this work there are two sections named Bibliography: one at the end of the gen-
eral part and another attached to the Annex. There are specific references in each; other ref-
erences are shared sources for both research approaches, and therefore appear repeated in 
both lists. 
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They often moved from philosophy to linguistics, mathematics, computer 
science, or economics—. (Van Benthem, 2011, p. 268) 
 
 Thus, there is a multitude of fields in which Logic can be applied. 
Thank you for your interest in this path toward using applied Logic on a 
new field: Negotiations.  
 This work consists of a creative and an innovative effort full of risks. 
The ‘experiment’ will confirm whether that innovation and risk were worthy 
and the reader will judge on the degree of accommodation.  
 
 In the following pages you will discover a new opportunity to apply Logical 
Dialogues, this time to deal with Negotiations, to solve conflicts (as objective ap-
plication), and even to serve peace (as a subjective option, since tools do not 
have an ethical value in themselves). 
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ACT I: The Bridge Game 
 
As has been said before, this work is the continuation of a previous 
one, The Bridge. A bridge toward Negotiations (Martínez-Cazalla, 2011). Thus, 
the next pages will be a sort of summary of the above, in order to enable a 
right support for the present reflection. We will use its most relevant data 
for our present research. Anyhow, the complete text is available to be con-
sulted at the Library of Economic, Social, Political Sciences and Communi-
cation (BSPO) at the Catholic University of Louvain (UCL). 
 
 In our previous research about Bridge and negotiations, we conceived 
negotiations as a double spiral, like DNA, and Bridge as its linkage. One of 
the spirals is the theoretical negotiation axis that supports a possible rational 
explanation about the implementation of negotiations; we named it the scaf-
fold. Consequently, the natural limit of the scaffold was its implementation, 
which we named the scaffolding, the other spiral, which supports the negotia-
tion itself –once the theory is implemented, it is not possible to change the 
events. Both spirals are simultaneous and intertwined; they cannot be un-
derstood separately and they exist always together, they are the two sides of 
the same coin. 
 
The scaffold was analysed in the theoretical-deductive way: we started 
from theory to achieve a practical application. All negotiations start with a 
decision, the decision of negotiating about something; Chapter 1 was an 
analysis of the Decision Theory. Given that this analysis was necessary but not 
sufficient because we needed the decision to be rational, we showed that the 
most rational decision would be the intersection point between the 
‘f(optimization)’ and ‘f(satisfaction)’. As satisfaction cannot be objectively calcu-
lated (the level of satisfaction is always subjective), the rationality of the de-
cision remains on the side of the objectivity, that is, on optimization. Both 
functions are mixed in games: the result of a game speaks about its optimi-
zation and the players speak about their satisfaction. Therefore, our second 
step was the analysis of rationality by means of Game Theory –Chapter 2. Once 
we completed the initial requisites of a negotiation, which include the deci-
sion of negotiating something and its rational basis, we were ready to ana-
lyse the negotiation from a theoretical approach with the purpose to answer 
the implicit question in this chapter: Is the Game Theory useful to make rational 
decisions in negotiations? –Chapter 3. Up to now we have been building the 
foundations, the first three steps of the theoretical negotiation spiral. We 
concluded that the rationality of decision-making in the course of a negotia-
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tion can be addressed by the rational study of a game that represents the 
negotiation. What game in particular will be studied?, and Why are we choosing this 
game and not another? This was the content of our next chapter, where we 
dealt with the fourth and last step of our scaffold –Chapter 4. Then it was 
the time to answer the question: Is Bridge a useful game to make rational decisions 
in the world of negotiations?  
 From this scaffold, we recover Chapter 4 turned here into Chapter 1.1: 
Bridge. Is it a useful game to make rational decisions in the world of negotiations? The 
aim of this chapter is just to know and understand the rationality that is im-
plicit in Bridge –and not to become expert Bridge players. Therefore, the 
length and depth of this chapter is restricted accordingly.  
 
 For the other spiral, the scaffolding, the procedure toward knowledge 
was empirical-inductive, starting from a specific case and reaching a feasible 
theory. Therefore, we tackled this practical spiral from a study case: Camp 
David Accords. This long, dense, comprehensive chapter –Chapter 5– was 
analysed in the most sceptical way. The goal was to know whether Bridge 
was a possible internal bridge –linkage– between the theoretical framework 
–scaffold– and the practical cases –scaffoldings. In order to accomplish that, 
we needed to study a past case (future cases cannot possibly prove a hy-
pothesis) and analyse it following an approach not based on the Game Theory. 
We did so because we suspected that Bridge would be the linkage. Other-
wise, the degree of accommodation between the two spirals could have 
been conditioned.  
 You will find former Chapter 5, the study case (scaffolding) Camp Da-
vid Accords, as Annex. 
 
  Once we had the two spirals defined, we could ask about the possible 
linking element. The element proposed as bridge was the Bridge game. 
Thus, the next part was an application of the Bridge game to a case of nego-
tiation. We chose to apply Bridge to Camp David Accords, making it possible 
to verify whether Bridge was a feasible bridge to the analysis of negotiations. 
In other words, we wanted to confirm that Bridge could be a possible 
bridge between the two spirals. Therefore, this section –Chapter 6– was an 
application of Chapter 4 (present Chapter 1.1) on Chapter 5 (present An-
nex). Our implicit questions here were: Is the Bridge game the element that bridges 
both spirals in negotiations? Could the Bridge game be a tool for a rational analysis of 
negotiations?  
 We retrieve here the study of the spirals linkage [–former Chapter 6–] 
as Chapter 1.2: Bridge application to Camp David Accords.  
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 Finally, the Conclusion was a reflection about the following: To what 
extent is it possible to consider Bridge as an element for a rational analysis of negotia-
tions? What light does it provide to our understanding of negotiations? Which are its 
limitations?, and How could we overcome these limitations? 
 We bring up these reflections here, turned into Chapter 1.3: The Bridge. 
A bridge toward Negotiations. Lights and Shadows. This chapter will not be a du-
plicate of the former Conclusion, since this second look at the subject has 
added some more light, as will be clarified through the pages of this book. 
At the end of this chapter, we will be able to suggest what the greatest shad-
ow is, to which we aim to throw some light along this research work. 
 
 Act I, composed by three chapters, will be the path to discover why the 
Bridge game is useful to make rational decisions in the world of negotiations 
and where its limitations are. 
 
Chapter 1.1: Bridge. Is it a useful game to make rational decisions in 
the world of negotiations?  
[This chapter is taken from Martínez-Cazalla, 2011, pp. 28-35. You will find 
in square brackets the additions and/or alterations to the original text]. 
We suggest studying Bridge […] because we [think] […] it is [the most 
appropriate game] to make rational decisions in the world of negotiations. 
Why do we [think so]? Because, since the Game Theory is based on the analysis 
of the [games as microcosms of situations of true conflict], and Bridge is a 
[…] game [of communication, strategy, and battle] (cf. Kast, 1993, p. 11), 
[…] [Bridge] could […] be the best reflection of a negotiation. For the pur-
pose of answering this question it will [be] necessary to analyse Bridge, fol-
lowing a step by step process, so we can prove Bridge is a useful game to 
make rational decisions and, more specifically, it is [a clear] illustration [of] 
what happens in a negotiation. [In order] to do this, we will answer three 
questions: What is its ontology? What is its epistemology? and […] Can we say that 
Bridge belongs to the Game Theory? 
The Bridge Ontology 
 Before starting with the analysis of the Bridge ontology we need [to 
offer a definition] of ontology. Ontology is “(…) a branch of metaphysics 
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concerned with the nature and relations of being”.10 In the case of the 
Bridge game, Which is the nature and relations of its being? To answer this ques-
tion we will use a [more] modern definition of ontology: “(…) an explicit 
specification of a conceptualization” (Gruber, 1993, p. 1). Therefore, we 
need to describe the underlying conceptualization in the explicit Bridge specifica-
tion.  
 The explicit Bridge specification responds to its conceptualization. This 
is the relation by means of a deck of cards equally shared among all players. 
The nature of [the] relations [among] […] [the] players appears covered [un-
der] its conceptualization, the conceptualization of a common language 
[shared by the] players. Therefore, the ontology […] we are talking about is 
a semantic ontology, since “A semantic ontology is a conceptualization, com-
mon to a community of agents that understand natural language, of the cat-
egories and relations that pervade the agents’ environment as a whole. It can 
be used to specify the logical form as the truth-functional meaning of agent 
messages embedded in natural language” (Schneider & Cunningham, 2003, 
p. 1403). [Thus], we [should] analyse the Bridge language to know its ontol-
ogy, its being. 
 The Bridge language is common to its four players, but the players are 
divided into two pairs (named: North-South, the host pair, and East-West, 
the visiting pair). The relation between pairs is non-cooperative, but [within] 
the pair they keep a cooperative relation. Through a conceptualized lan-
guage (common to the community of players) the players reach an accord 
about which will be the trumps (no-trumps is [also a] possibility of trumps). 
The [object of the game] is to reach the best communication possible be-
tween players of the same pair that use a common language, which is also 
known by the other pair. [All announcements must be true, lies are not al-
lowed]. The objective is to reach the maximum of possible tricks from the 
probabilistic and combinatorial calculus. Apparently, Bridge is a non-
cooperative game […], but in Bridge the winner is the pair that has reached 
the 100% of the possible tricks [in more hands]; for that, [a kind of collabo-
ration between the pairs is strictly necessary, therefore the meta-Bridge 
game is a sort of win-win negotiation]. [In an ideal hand, which is quite 
common in Bridge], when a pair [proponent] obtains a [surplus trick, it] is 
not because it has played very well, it is always because the other pair [oppo-
nent] has played wrongly; and when a pair [proponent] does not obtain all 
                                              
10 Definition of [the] word ontology in: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1st meaning. Retrieved from 
http://www.britannica.com/bps/dictionary?query=ontology [We are choosing the definition 
from a generic source, as the Encyclopædia Britannica, and not from a particular theoretical 
framework, in order to preserve the rigour and the aseptic nature of this research]. 
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the possible tricks [,it] is […] [because it has played wrong, and not] because 
the opponent has played very well. Therefore, in Bridge there is always an 
intrinsic collaboration process. Every obtained trick [over] or [below] the 
average will be a ‘gift’ (over) or a ‘loss’ (below), but [that is not the aim of the 
game, except for some cases where tricks may be won or lost as a result of 
the probabilistic skills used to play a particular hand combination. In these 
cases, the result over or below the expected will depend on the quality of 
the player’s play. Such a scenario is not the usual; most Bridge hands are 
regular –ideal– ones, and these are the hands we are analysing here]. To un-
derstand this apparent paradox [–cooperative + non-cooperative game = 
win-win meta-game–] it is necessary to analyse the Bridge epistemology 
[first]. 
The Bridge Epistemology 
We will start by offering a definition of epistemology. Epistemology is 
“(…) the study or a theory of the nature and grounds of knowledge espe-
cially with reference to its limits and validity”.11 If the nature of Bridge is 
founded on […] mathematical principles, then in order to know the struc-
ture of Bridge it will be necessary to apply reasoning in accordance with [the 
principles of mathematical Logic, since] Logic is “(…) a science that deals 
with the principles and criteria of validity of inference and demonstration: 
the science of the formal principles of reasoning”.12 Therefore, our mission 
will be to discover the logic that lies behind its ontology, as “Formally, an 
ontology is the statement of a logical theory” (Gruber, 1993, p. 2). [Thus], 
our question shall be connected with the underlying Bridge logic, [which is] 
founded on the [mathematical principles of combinatorics and probability].  
 
 […] Bridge is played by four players, and as the deck has 52 cards, […] 
each player holds 13 cards. [These] 13 cards are obtained by random distri-
bution (C1352*C1339*C1326*C1313 = 52! / 13! 13! 13! 13! –cf. Borel & Chéron, 
2009, p. 38). This is the first step of the game and the only hazardous [one]. 
From here [on], all the other steps will be an application, more or less cor-
rect [–the degree of correction depends only on the player’s knowledge and 
                                              
11 Definition of [the] word epistemology in: Encyclopædia Britannica, 2nd meaning. Retrieved from 
http://www.britannica.com/bps/dictionary?query=epistemology [We are choosing the defi-
nition from a generic source, as the Encyclopædia Britannica, and not from a particular theoreti-
cal framework, in order to preserve the rigour and the aseptic nature of this research]. 
12 Definition of [the] word logic in: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1st meaning a (1). Retrieved from 
http://www.britannica.com/bps/dictionary?query=logic [We are choosing the definition 
from a generic source, as the Encyclopædia Britannica, and not from a particular theoretical 
framework, in order to preserve the rigour and the aseptic nature of this research]. 
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qualities–], of [the mathematical principles of combinatorics and probabil-
ity]. As the game implies [getting] the highest number of possible tricks, eve-
ry time a player plays a card the others must play a card too. The played 
cards will be only those [that] fulfil the rules of the game: they must always 
[be] […] of the same suit. [In case the players] do not have any, then there 
are two possibilities: either they play trump or they play [another] suit. […] 
[The routine will be]: 
[0.]  Whoever starts the game will choose a card (C113), and then the next 
 players will have two possibilities:  
 1.  If they have cards in the played suit, then they will choose from 
 those in the played suit (C1n=number of cards in the played suit). 
 2.  If they do not have cards in the played suit, then they will choose 
 from [the] other cards. Again, there are two more possibilities: 
 2.1.  If [they] play at trumps: 
 2.1.1. Then [they will have to] play a trump (C1n=number of cards 
in trumps). 
 2.1.2. Then [they will have to] play a card of [another] suit 
(C1n=number of cards in another suit). 
 2.2.  If [they] play at no-trumps: [they will always have] the pos-
sibility to play any card (C113). 
 The winner of the trick is the one who has played the highest [card] of 
the played suit, or who has played the highest [trumps card], if they [play at] 
trumps. If they are playing at no-trumps, then the winner trick will always be 
the highest [card] of the played suit. […] 
 Evidently, [as the game goes on, there is] a smaller [choice for every 
trick] (C113-n [n=] number of played [tricks], being ‘n’ in accordance with the chosen case (case 1 or case 2 –2.1.1.; 
2.1.2. or 2.2). Therefore, in each trick we have less [choices for] the possible cas-
es. […]. This makes [it] really important to choose the card which is in ‘per-
fect symmetry’, […] we need to know when to play [it] –once a card has 
been played, [this] card will not be available for the next [tricks]. This is the 
explanation [to] our paradox [–cooperative + non-cooperative game = win-
win meta-game]. This necessity of ‘perfect symmetry’ is the key to obtain 
[…] 100% of the possible tricks, and [therefore it] is strictly necessary that 
each player plays the ‘symmetric’ card. We can say that Bridge is a coopera-
tive game […] hidden behind a non-cooperative face [both under the ‘um-
brella’ of a win-win negotiation at the meta-game level].  
 Being Bridge a game with such complexity (non-cooperative between 
the pairs, but at the same time cooperative [within] each pair), Can we say that 
Bridge belongs to the Game Theory? 
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[Does] Bridge belong to the Game Theory 
 According to the analysis [of the] […] Game Theory [(cf. Martínez-
Cazalla, 2011, pp. 20-24)], we can conclude that Bridge belongs to the Game 
Theory. [This is a] non-cooperative/cooperative [game in which] two collective parties 
(two pairs) [deal with] one issue (the game itself). The goal is to achieve a spe-
cific effect by applying [a] strategy; this achievement [is based] on the prob-
abilistic combinatorial mathematical calculus. […] Hazard is only present at 
the moment [when the cards are distributed, and] never during the develop-
ment of the game. 
 In fact, Bridge belongs to the category of the ideal games (cf. McClen-
nen, 1992, pp. 47-60), [which characteristics are]: 
 
(1) Common knowledge13 [footnote added]. There is full common knowledge 
of (a) the rationality of both players (whatever that turns out to mean), and 
(b) the strategy structure of the game for all players, and the preferences 
that each has with respect to outcomes. 
The force of this condition is that a player i knows something that is rele-
vant to a rational resolution of i’s decision problem, then any other player j 
knows that player i has that knowledge. This is typically taken to imply 
(among other things) that one player cannot have a conclusive reason, to 
which no other player has access, for choosing in a certain manner. That 
is, there are not hidden arguments for playing one way as opposed to an-
other. 
In addition, one invariably finds that the analysis proceeds by appeal to the 
following (at least partial) characterization of rational behaviour for the in-
dividual participant. 
(2) Utility maximization. Each player’s preference ordering over the abstract-
ly conceived space of outcomes and probability distributions over the 
events that condition such outcomes can be represented by a utility func-
tion, unique up to positive affine transformations, that satisfies the ex-
pected-utility principle. 
(3) Consequentialism. Choice among available strategies is strictly a function 
of the preferences the agent has with respect to the outcomes (or disjunc-
tive set of outcomes) associated with each strategy. 
Following Hammond (1988), condition (3) can be taken to imply that 
strategies are nothing more than neutral access routes to outcomes (or dis-
junctions of outcomes); the latter are what preferentially count for the 
agent. In particular, then, if two strategies yield exactly the same probabili-
                                              
13 [It should be noted that the term common knowledge, as understood here, does not necessarily 
have the same meaning it has in the context of epistemic Logic]. 
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ties of the same outcomes occurring, then the agent will be indifferent be-
tween those strategies. (McClennen, 1992, pp. 47-48) 
 
 We can recognise the Bridge ontology and epistemology in these three 
characteristics of the ideal games. Therefore, we can assume Bridge [belongs] 
to the Game Theory. […] Then, Will it be a useful game to make rational decisions in 
the world of negotiations? 
Is Bridge a useful game to make rational decisions in the world of 
negotiations? 
 Following […] [the] Decision Theory [(cf. Martínez-Cazalla, 2011, pp. 15-
19)], the more rational decision would be found in the intersection point 
between the ‘f(optimization)’ and ‘f(satisfaction)’. As the satisfaction cannot be 
objectively calculated (the level of satisfaction is always subjective) the ra-
tionality of the decision remains on the side of the objectivity, that is in the 
optimization, and, as [both functions are mixed in the games, and as the 
result of a game tells about its optimization], then the Game Theory [is] useful 
to find the intersection point. Furthermore, [according to] […] [the] Negotia-
tion Theory [(cf. Martínez-Cazalla, 2011, pp. 25-27)], if the rationality of the 
decision-making in the course of a negotiation can be addressed by the ra-
tional study of the game that represents the negotiation, then we can state 
that Bridge is a useful game to make rational decisions in the world of nego-
tiations.  
 
 At this point it seems that our question is solved; but incisive minds 
[still] have another question: Why have we chosen Bridge as [the] game to make 
rational decisions in the world of negotiations, and not any other game? There are two 
answers, one [is] more theoretical and the other one [is] more connected 
with life. 
-  From a theoretical point of view, Bridge fulfils the characteristics [of] a 
game to make rational decisions in the world of negotiations. It is a 
cooperative game with two parties and [one] issue, [and] at the same 
time Bridge is a non-cooperative game. In short, although the ideal 
game to negotiate is a cooperative game (collaboration-compromise), 
[the bargaining is always a competition, anyway]. In fact, in almost all 
negotiations, the real situation is a bargaining mix (cf. Lewicki, Barry & 
Saunders, 2004, p. 38): [one part of the agreement is the consequence 
of collaboration and another part is the consequence of competition]. 
In addition, Bridge is a [non-random] game. It [shows] a perfect 
mathematical symmetry, where the use of ‘dialogue’ intra-pair and in-
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ter-pairs is a ruled system where there is a constant maintenance of 
common knowledge [–common knowledge as understood by McClennen 
(quoted in page 11), and not necessarily having the same meaning as 
in the context of epistemic Logic–] (cf. Kiel & Schader, 1994, pp. 
171-180). Also, the fact that the winner is the pair that [has reached 
100% of the possible tricks in more hands] entails that [players are 
very close to] the intersection point of optimization and satisfaction. 
[This means a win-win result at the meta-game level, because this score 
is the consequence of a strictly mathematical application of rules: 
nothing has been stolen from the opponent].  
- From [an experiential] point of view, Bridge [is similar to life]. If we ana-
lyse each instant of our life, we [will] see that we always have a part-
ner, [sometimes] even [a partner who remains] hidden, […] that pro-
vides us with something […] we have not, but […] we […] need in 
that precise moment of our life. At the same time, there is always 
somebody, [sometimes] even [a person who remains] hidden, who 
does not want [us to] we reach our goal. The elements that we have 
in favour or against our goal, [are the ‘life cards’; depending on the 
way we play them, we] will achieve a higher, or lesser, degree of op-
timization and satisfaction in our own life. If we are strong in one of 
the elements, we will struggle to lean on it, and consequently we will 
[propose to] play at trumps; if we [have similar strength] in all the el-
ements, we will try to lean on all, and then we shall play at no-trumps. 
 […] We have chosen Bridge because […] it [seems to be a very appro-
priate model] to make rational decisions in the world of negotiations and in 
the sphere of life. The game of Life is the art of trading and negotiating with 
Life at every moment of [our] life, and Bridge [could be] the best theoretical 
representation of the game of Life. [We will test it in the next chapter]. 
 
Chapter 1.2: Bridge application to […] Camp David Accords  
[This chapter is taken from Martínez-Cazalla, 2011, pp. 71-81. You will find 
in square brackets the additions and/or alterations to the original text].  
 [Before starting this chapter, you are asked to create a scenario for the 
application]: 
 
Let us imagine that we are on August 1978. It is summer time, we are en-
joying our holidays and the telephone rings. The prestigious editor in chief 
of a foreign affairs magazine –who knows our great love [for] Bridge and 
our great interest […] [in] negotiations– proposes us the challenge of writ-
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ing an article for [their] magazine. This article must be a prediction about 
what will happen, what will be the possible rational agreement at the […] 
[Camp David summit] (scheduled [for] the next month, September 1978). 
[…] This article [has] a condition: the prediction can only be based on a 
virtual Bridge game played [by] the leaders [meeting] at the summit (Begin, 
Sadat and Carter). And we [do accept], perhaps because of the heat’s 
drowsiness, or perhaps because we are crazy [for] logical challenges. (Mar-
tínez-Cazalla, 2011, p. 70) 
 
[The objective information about what happened can be found in the An-
nex document. This information will always be available to corroborate the 
Bridge application to our study case]. 
 
 The starting point [of] this chapter is two questions: Is [the] Bridge game 
the element that bridges both spirals in […] negotiations? Could [the Bridge game] be a 
tool for a rational analysis of […] negotiations? To answer [these questions], we 
will apply a hypothetical [Bridge game to] the ‘future’ possible agreement [in 
Camp David], [as we proposed at the introductory pages to this act]. Thus, 
the game starts and [the] only information available is the literature [on] the 
history [of] […] relationships [among the parties] and their preparation for 
the meeting. Both, information and literature are very weak because at this 
time (this imaginary game took place in August 1978) the Israeli Government did 
not allow [public access to the statistical yearbook abstract, which was kept] 
strictly confidential. This is the reason [why] our data game cannot be 
founded on official sources. Therefore, this game is based on our personal 
background on this matter. 
 
 A Bridge game starts with the identification of the two pairs: the 
North–South pair (host pair) and the East–West [pair] (the visiting pair). 
Who is North–South, the host pair? The [pair which] plays at home, in this case, 
[is] Carter and Begin. Carter is the host because the negotiations will take 
place [in] the USA, and the USA is the historical ally of Israel. Then, who is 
the East–West, the visiting pair? The visiting pair is Carter and Sadat. The alli-
ance between USA and Egypt is really weak: [from] a historical perspective 
Egypt is a country under the USSR influence –we are still at the Cold War 
era–, and from the perspective of […] interests, although they are not [very 
many], […] the USA needs guaranteed […] the Middle East raw materials 
[while] Egypt needs the financial aid [of] the USA.  
 Both pairs have now been identified. [As we see], one of the players 
will play in both teams. Is that possible? In our case yes, because [one of the 
players –Carter for USA– is not interested in the object of negotiation] (the 
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object is the condition to achieve [the] goal; in our case, [the object is] the 
occupied territories [from] the ‘67 War). [The USA only interest is to reach 
peace in the Middle East, the aim of this negotiation. Thus, their proper role 
is to be the mediator]. […] Then, as the USA do not take part directly on 
the object (necessary condition as mediator) and [as it is playing in both 
teams] (condition of sufficiency [in the case the mediator is not only a medi-
ator, but he also has a direct interest in the goal achievement]), we can 
[omit] Carter from the game [proper]. [Thus, we are lucky because our game 
will be even simpler. Since the game deals with the object itself, and not 
with the objective, the goal is the consequence of the game but not the 
game itself]. Carter will be present in the game as a hidden force, reinforcing 
[the strength of each one of the other players but not directly playing].  
 Summarizing, we are [at the table and we] have two real players: Begin 
versus Sadat; we have 52 cards (a deck of cards) which represent the object 
that is at stake –the occupied territories during the ’67 War–, [and] we have 
the goal: the peace in the Middle East.  
 
 [This] is the [time] to look at the cards. Who has what? Before the [card] 
distribution, we have agreed that: 
1. A deck of cards has 52 cards divided in 4 equal14 suits.  
2.  Each suit [symbolises] an aspect of the object (political, financial, 
 social, and cultural). 
3.  Each card [symbolises] a rational argument in [pursuit of] the object 
on a specific aspect. In fact, we will turn the rational arguments […] 
into [numerical] values –cards– and risk them based on [the] rules 
of the Bridge game. These rules, as we have seen [in] Chapter [1.1], 
are a probabilistic combinatorial calculus, [where chance never has 
a] part.  
 4. The spades suit [symbolises] the political aspect [of the] object. 
 5. The hearts suit [symbolises] the financial aspect [of the] object. 
 6. The diamonds suit [symbolises] the social aspect [of the] object. 
 7.  The clubs suit [symbolises] the cultural aspect [of the] object.  
 8. We have only one object to play: the occupied territories from the 
’67 War. [However], the territories are five: East Jerusalem, the Sinai 
Peninsula, the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights (they are 
                                              
14 Equal in number –13 cards per suit– but not in score, [which is different for spades and 
hearts, and for diamonds and clubs]. [In a] Bridge [game] the score is important but, in our 
simulation, the suit score is [irrelevant] because in our case the importance comes from the 
argument related [to] the object that the card symbolises in each [particular] suit.  
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[mentioned here] in order of importance. This order will be used 
[…] for the card [assignment]). 
9. The [card value is, in decreasing order]: Ace, K, Q, J, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 
5, 4, 3, 2, [and] it is the [same] for each suit. 
 10.  The [face value of each card] is: Ace=4 points; K=3 points; Q=2 
points; J=1 point; for the [rest it] is null. 
 11. As we have 5 objects […] and 13 cards [per] suit, [let us] agree that 
[…] every two consecutive cards [in each suit] will symbolise one 
object, according to the importance given [to the] objects, suits and 
cards, [as mentioned before]. [For instance, in our case] Ace and K 
of spades will symbolise the political arguments [for] East Jerusa-
lem, Q and J [of] hearts will symbolise the financial arguments [for 
the] Sinai Peninsula, 10 and 9 [of] diamonds will symbolise the so-
cial arguments [for the] West Bank, 8 and 7 of clubs will symbolise 
the cultural arguments [for] Gaza, […] 6 and 5 of [all suits] will 
symbolise the arguments [for] the Golan Heights.  
 12.  Consequently, we will always have three surplus cards ([…] 4, 3 and 
2 of each suit), [which] will be the added value [for] the generic [...] 
aspect [of each suit] (e.g.: […] 4, 3 and 2 of spades will symbolise 
the added [generic] political value [for] the object [–the object being 
the whole] territories occupied from the ’67 War). 
  
 Once we have agreed these 12 points, we can distribute the cards: 
 - Spades distribution (political arguments): 
Ace: Political argument [for] East Jerusalem. [Face value] = 4 
points. [It goes to] Begin (it is the Jewish Holy City). 
K: Political argument [for] East Jerusalem. [Face value] = 3 points. 
[It goes to] Sadat (it is the Third Muslim Holy City and [it was an old 
Muslim territory of Jordan before the ’67 War]). 
Q: Political argument [for] the Sinai Peninsula. [Face value] = 2 
points. [It goes to] Begin (it is a war conquest and it entails the con-
trol [over one of the banks of the Suez Canal]). 
J: Political argument [for] the Sinai Peninsula. [Face value] = 1 
point. [It goes to] Sadat (it [was an historical] Egyptian Territory and 
it entails the Egyptian control [over both banks of the Suez Canal]).  
10: Political argument [for] the West Bank. [Face value] = 0 points. 
[It goes to] Begin (it is a war conquest). 
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9: Political argument [for] the West Bank. [Face value] = 0 points. 
[It goes to] Sadat (it [was an old Muslim territory from Jordan be-
fore] the ’67 War). 
8: Political argument [for] Gaza. [Face value] = 0 points. [It goes to] 
Begin (it is a war conquest). 
7: Political argument [for] Gaza. [Face value] = 0 points. [It goes to] 
Sadat (it [was an old Egyptian territory before] the ’67 War). 
6: Political argument [for] the Golan Heights. [Face value] = 0 
points. [It goes to] Begin (it is a war conquest). 
5: Political argument [for] the Golan Heights. [Face value] = 0 
points. [It goes to] Sadat (it [was an old Muslim territory from Syria 
before] to the ’67 War). 
4, 3 and 2: The added [generic political] value over the occupied ter-
ritories. [Face value] = 0 points. 4: [It goes to] Begin (he is the pre-
sent ‘landowner’); 3: [It goes to] Sadat (the mediator, Carter offers it 
because he needs to have a foot in the East World); 2: [It goes to] 
Begin (Carter is the ally of Begin, [thus he cannot] ‘snatch’ [the oc-
cupied territories from] Begin. [Besides], we should remember that 
Israel has nuclear weapons –manufactured at the nuclear plant in 
Dimona). 
 - Hearts distribution (financial arguments): 
Ace: Financial argument [for] Jerusalem East. [Face value] = 4 
points. [It goes to] Begin (it is the Jewish and Christian Holy City. 
The religious tourism is a [source of] high financial potential […]). 
K: Financial argument [for] East Jerusalem. [Face value] = 3 
points. [It goes to] Sadat (it is the third Muslim Holy City. The reli-
gious tourism is a [source of] high potential financial […], perhaps 
not so directly to Egypt but [it clearly is] to the Muslim world, [and 
particularly] to Jordan, the landowner of East Jerusalem before the 
’67 War).  
Q: Financial argument [for] the Sinai Peninsula. [Face value] = 2 
points. [It goes to] Begin (it entails the control [over] one of the Su-
ez Canal banks). 
J: Financial argument [for] the Sinai Peninsula. [Face value] = 1 
point. [It goes to] Sadat (it [was] an old Egyptian territory [before] 
the ’67 War. It entails the Egyptian control [over] the two Suez Canal 
banks).  
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10: Financial argument [for] the West Bank. [face value] = 0 points. 
[It goes to] Begin (it could potentially contribute to increase the 
Gross Domestic Product). 
9: Financial argument [for] the West Bank. [Face value] = 0 points. 
[It goes to] Begin too (the territory could be developed economically 
but it would not be a benefit for Egypt as it did not belong to [it]). 
8: Financial argument [for] Gaza. [Face value] = 0 points. [It goes 
to] Begin (it could potentially contribute to increase the Gross Do-
mestic Product). 
7: Financial argument [for] Gaza. [Face value] = 0 points. [It goes 
to] Sadat (it [was] an old Egyptian territory [before] the ’67 War. It 
could potentially contribute to increase the Gross Domestic Product). 
6: Financial argument [for] the Golan Heights. [Face value] = 0 
points. [It goes to] Begin (Israel needs the water from the Golan 
Heights). 
5: Financial argument [for] the Golan Heights. [Face value] = 0 
points. [It goes also to] Begin (Egypt cannot have financial interest 
in a territory that did not belong to [it]). 
4, 3 and 2: The added [generic financial] value over the occupied ter-
ritories. [Face value] = 0 points. 4: [It goes to] Begin (he is already 
the ‘landowner’); 3: [It goes to] Sadat (the mediator, Carter offers it 
because he needs the Egyptian oil); 2: [It goes to] Begin (Carter is 
the ally of Begin, [so] he cannot betray Begin). 
 - Diamonds distribution (social arguments): 
Ace: Social argument [for] East Jerusalem. [Face value] = 4 points. 
[It goes to] Begin (it is the Jewish Holy City. It is the only one terri-
tory really occupied to the Jewish population). 
K: Social argument [for] East Jerusalem. [Face value] = 3 points. [It 
goes to] Begin ([as in the previous argument], the Jewish population 
is the majority in East Jerusalem). 
Q: Social argument [for] the Sinai Peninsula. [Face value] = 2 
points. [It goes to] Sadat (the majority [of the] population is Egyp-
tian. It [was] an old Egyptian territory [before] the ’67 War). 
J: Social argument [for] the Sinai Peninsula. [Face value] = 1 point. 
[It goes to] Begin (it gives [Israel] the opportunity to increase popu-
lation). 
10: Social argument [for] the West Bank. [Face value] = 0 points. [It 
goes to] Sadat (the majority of the population is Palestine). 
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9: Social argument [for] the West Bank. [Face value] = 0 points. [It 
goes to] Begin (it gives [Israel] the opportunity to increase popula-
tion). 
8: Social argument [for] Gaza. [Face value] = 0 points. [It goes to] 
Sadat (the majority [of the] population is Egyptian/Palestine. It [was] 
an old Egyptian territory [before] the ’67 War).  
7: Social argument [for] Gaza. [Face value] = 0 points. [It goes to] 
Begin (it gives [Israel] the opportunity to increase population).  
6: Social argument [for] the Golan Heights. [Face value] = 0 points. 
[It goes to] Sadat (the majority of the population is Palestine and/or 
Muslim).  
5: Social argument [for] the Golan Heights. [Face value] = 0 points. 
[It goes to] Begin (it gives [Israel] the opportunity to increase popu-
lation). 
4, 3 and 2: The added [generic social] value over the occupied territo-
ries. [Face value] = 0 points. 4 and 3: [It goes to] Sadat (the majority 
of the population in the occupied territories is Egyptian, Palestine 
and/or Muslim, […] not Jewish); 2: [It goes to] Begin (he is the pre-
sent ‘landowner’). 
 - Clubs distribution (cultural arguments): 
Ace: Cultural argument [for] East Jerusalem. [Face value] = 4 
points. [It goes to] Begin (it is the Jewish Holy City). 
K: Cultural argument [for] East Jerusalem. [Face value] = 3 points. 
[It goes to] Sadat (it is the third Muslim Holy City). 
Q: Cultural argument [for] the Sinai Peninsula. [Face value] = 2 
points. [It goes to] Sadat (it is the memorable territory of Egypt). 
J: Cultural argument [for] the Sinai Peninsula. [Face value] = 1 
point. [It goes to] Sadat (the Sinai is de facto a historical Egyptian 
territory). 
10: Cultural argument [for] the West Bank. [Face value] = 0 points. 
[It goes to] Sadat (the majority [of the] population is Palestine). 
9: Cultural argument [for] the West Bank. [Face value] = 0 points. 
[It goes to] Begin (it is located [within] the Promised Land border15).  
                                              
15 The Promised Land border taken from the Holy Torah, Genesis 15:18 (The Jewish Publication 
Society of America, 1917). 
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8: Cultural argument [for] Gaza. [Face value] = 0 points. [It goes to] 
Sadat (the majority of the population is Egyptian/Palestine. It [was] 
an old Egyptian territory [before] the ’67 War). 
7: Cultural argument [for] Gaza. [Face value] = 0 points. [It goes to] 
Begin (it is located [within] the Promised Land border). 
6: Cultural argument [for] the Golan Heights. [Face value] = 0 
points. [It goes to] Sadat (the majority of the population is Palestine 
[and/or] Muslim). 
5: Cultural argument [for] the Golan Heights. [Face value] = 0 
points. [It goes to] Begin (it is located [within] the Promised Land 
border). 
4, 3 and 2: The added [generic cultural] value over the occupied terri-
tories. [Face value] = 0 points. 4 and 2: [It goes to] Sadat (the ma-
jority of the population on the occupied territories is Egyptian, Pales-
tine […] or Muslim, […] not Jewish); 3: [It goes to] Begin (Four out 
of the five territories are [within] the Promised Land border). 
 
Now we know the [card assignment], the result is as follows: 
For Begin: 
♠  Ace, Q, 10, 8, 6, 4, 2 = 7 cards/6 points in ♠ 
♥  Ace, Q, 10, 9, 8, 6, 5, 4, 2 = 9 cards/6 points in ♥ 
♦  Ace, K, J, 9, 7, 5, 2 = 7 cards/8 points in ♦ 
♣ Ace, 9, 7, 5, 3 = 5 cards/4 points in ♣ 
 Total cards: C2852 Total points: P2440 
 
For Sadat: 
♠  K, J, 9, 7, 5, 3 = 6 cards/4 points in ♠ 
♥  K, J, 7, 3 = 4 cards/4 points in ♥ 
♦  Q, 10, 8, 6, 4, 3 = 6 cards/2 points in ♦ 
♣ K, Q, J, 10, 8, 6, 4, 2 = 8 cards/6 points in ♣ 
 Total cards: C2452 Total points: P1640 
 […] [Let us point out that, though the number of cards is not equal for 
both players], this is not a real problem because the difference can be con-
sidered […] negligible, as we are [assuming] a balance of +/- 2 cards [per 
player] and [their] score in points [is] 24/40=60% for Begin and 
16/40=40% for Sadat. This difference is acceptable because […] at least 
one player [should have] 30% of the points; in our case there are two players 
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(not four), [so one of them should have at least 60% of points, and Begin 
does]. 
[It is the time to know which will be the trumps?] […] It is evident that 
Begin will decide on the trumps (he has the majority, 60%, of the points at 
stake and in this case also [the majority of] the cards, [53.85%]).  [In order] 
to play […] trumps [it] is necessary to have at least [one-half] + 1 of [the] 
possible cards on this suit (13/2=6.5≈7cards) and [it is] desirable [to have 
one-half] +2, [which] means 8 cards. Begin [will choose] to play at trumps 
in hearts, but Sadat [will choose] to play at trumps in clubs. As Begin is 
stronger [in] all suits, even in clubs, because he has the Ace + 4 cards to 
support it, he will decide that the trumps will be no-trumps. Sadat will agree 
to play at no-trumps. In the Bridge terminology, the [accord] is expressed as: 
1♥ Begin, 2♣ Sadat, 3NT Begin, Pass Sadat, [Pass Begin]. The game 
starts and the promise is: “I Begin, [I] promise that playing at no-trumps, I 
will achieve at least 18 tricks [out of] the possible 24” [(18 tricks –because 
3NT means 9 tricks when there are 4 players– [out of] 24 and not [out of] 
26 because Egypt only has 24 cards)].  
 
We are ready [for] the crucial moment of [the] game:  
Begin 
♠ Ace, Q, 10, 8, 6, 4, 2  ♥ Ace, Q, 10, 9, 8, 6, 5, 4, 2   
♠ K, J, 9, 7, 5, 3            ♥ K, J, 7, 3    
Sadat   
  Begin    
  ♦ Ace, K, J, 9, 7, 5, 2 ♣ Ace, 9, 7, 5, 3 
                           ♦ Q, 10, 8, 6, 4, 3     ♣ K, Q, J, 10, 8, 6, 4, 2 
 Sadat 
 
 Sadat starts the game. At no-trumps [it] is convenient to play the 
fourth [card] of the long suit, or the highest [card of the long suit in the case 
of having a sequence; here, the second option is chosen]. Then Sadat will 
play K♣, since it is the only possibility to reinforce the Q♣ and J♣, because 
Begin will use the Ace in other suits to reinforce his position and if Sadat 
plays [any other suit] before Begin, he will always lose. The only possibility 
for Sadat is to agree with everything, although he could [remind Begin] his 
[own] political and financial force. [Facing this case], the only feasible op-
tions for Sadat are Q♣ and J♣. In a real Bridge game, Sadat could win oth-
er tricks [thanks to observance of turns to play, while in] a conversation, the 
turn is not [always respected]. 
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Therefore, what is the true profit for Sadat? The true profit for Sadat is 
the cultural matter over the Sinai Peninsula (Q and J in clubs). Where can Sa-
dat [place] the strength in this negotiation? Sadat can only put the strength on the 
importance of the return to the Sinai Peninsula. He will need to keep the 
negotiation around this matter all the time. That will be his key point. And, 
what is the true profit for Begin? The true profit for Begin is to reaffirm his 
power in the region.  
 
 At this time, [let us] remember the principle [that] should not be for-
gotten […]: [the result of the game is not to be conditioned]. What happened 
in Camp David? The agreement was to return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. 
[The goal], The Framework for Peace in the Middle East, was achieved, and the 
Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel was 
[agreed].  
So, [we can now answer the questions]: 
1.  [Is the Bridge game the element that bridges both spirals in negotiations?] 
 […] Our forecast on Camp David Accords has been right. We can as-
sert that the Camp David [summit was] a resounding success, [de-
spite many people thinking that it was a failure]. According to the 
previous [reflection], the best rational decision is the intersection 
point between ‘f(optimization)’ and ‘f(satisfaction)’. This point will be, at 
the same time, the [consequence] of optimizing to [the] maximum 
our true possibilities and not losing anything [but what was already 
lost] before the negotiation […]. Herein the satisfaction: obtaining 
all obtainable and losing only the indispensable. To get more is a 
‘gift’ [and to get less is] a ‘loss’, but [neither is the consequence of] a 
rational decision because [these] would [only] be the result of a mis-
take [during the] negotiation [process]. Therefore, we can say that 
Bridge bridges both spirals in […] negotiations, because it [com-
bines] optimization [and satisfaction (obtaining all what is obtaina-
ble and losing only what has already been lost before the negotia-
tion)] with implementation. Bridge is not only a theory; it is a theory 
that can be implemented in reality. 
2.  [Could the Bridge game be a tool for a rational analysis of negotiations?] 
 The Bridge game is a good application to analyse the real possibili-
ties in a […] negotiation, because it bridges both spirals […], and 
because it [combines] optimization (obtaining all obtainable) and 
[…] satisfaction (losing only the indispensable, [what is already] lost 
before the negotiation) together with the implementation [which 
contains in itself the win-win idea]. [Besides], Bridge is not only a the-
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ory, it is a theory that turns […] [unquantifiable values] (the argu-
ments) [into] countable [values] (the cards [with] their values), so we 
can play; and we can also [do] the other way round and [see] what 
has happened. Therefore, Bridge [can] be a tool for the rational 
analysis of […] negotiations. 
[We can now move on to go through the lights and shadows of the 
Bridge application on negotiations].    
 
Chapter 1.3: The Bridge. A bridge toward Negotiations. Lights and 
Shadows  
[This chapter is taken from Martínez-Cazalla, 2011, pp. 82-84. You will find 
in square brackets the additions and/or alterations to the original text].  
As we announced at the [introductory pages of this act, this chapter is 
an attempt] to answer the following questions: To what extent is it possible to 
consider Bridge as an element for a rational analysis of […] negotiations? What light 
does it provide to our understanding of […] negotiations? Which are its limitations? 
[and] How could we overcome these limitations?  
 
About the first question, To what extent is it possible to consider Bridge as an 
element for a rational analysis of […] negotiations?, the answer has already been 
suggested at the conclusion of the previous chapter. [Firstly], we would like 
to [stress] the fact that Bridge is not only a theory, but a theory that turns 
[…] [unquantifiable values] (the arguments) [into] countable [values] (the 
cards [with] their values); [this is why] we can play, but we can also [do] the 
other way around, and see what has happened [in order to evaluate past ne-
gotiations, or to prepare future negotiations]. Bridge, connecting the two 
spirals has become an abducing tool, that is, Bridge makes [it] possible to 
propose the following syllogism: we have a great premise and it is evident, 
and we have [a lesser one, which is also] evident or only probable, [then 
Bridge allows us to link them together]. We have the theoretical spiral, 
which starts from a theoretical-deductive process, [which] is evident; and we 
have the implementation, the […] negotiation itself, which starts from an 
empirical-inductive process because not all negotiation details are evident or 
probable. Finally, we need something to bridge, to link [theory and imple-
mentation, in order] to [reach] a conclusion. As Bridge makes [it] possible to 
turn [the unquantifiable values of the negotiation] (that is, the empirical val-
ues) into countable [values] (the theoretical values), and inversely, then we 
can find the link between both. We are now ready to arrive to a conclusion. 
Bridge [meets the two points of view that Rudnianski & Bestougeff (2007) 
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pointed out in their work Bridging Games and Diplomacy]: “(...) prescriptive 
studies [theoretical-deductive], concerned with procedures for achieving 
good outcomes, and the descriptive studies [empirical-inductive], focused 
on understanding how people negotiate” (p. 150). […] Although Bridge be-
longs to the Game Theory, it offers the possibility of not being only a laborato-
ry analysis. In this way, the Bridge application is a step forward [from] the 
Adjusted Winner Procedure (cf. Brams & Taylor, 1996, pp. 68-75), [because] in 
Bridge we [not only] ascribe a value [to] the different aspects of the issue, 
[which] is the same starting point [as that of] the Adjusted Winner Procedure, 
[but] Bridge puts these values [–issues–] at risk [for what they are worth by] 
themselves, and simultaneously [for what they mean for the players and for 
their goal]. The value [fluctuates] from virtual to real [and] it is a constant 
feedback. [Therefore, Bridge allows for having a goal beyond the object at 
stake]. 
 
 In order to answer the question: What light does [Bridge] provide to our un-
derstanding of […] negotiations? […] Bridge gives us the opportunity to [cor-
roborate whether] a [certain] […] negotiation was, or will be, a success or a 
failure. As [a] linkage element, it [yields] simultaneously an overview and an 
internal detailed vision. We […] need to remember now […] that the winner 
is the pair that has reached 100% of the possible tricks [in more hands]. 
Therefore, the Bridge application [tells] us about the degree of true success 
or true failure: [a non-random success or failure, which is just a mathemati-
cal result, and thus, a win-win result]. [We often] conclude: “the negotiation 
was or will be a success” or “the negotiation was or will be a failure”, but 
[many times] we mistake our wishes and/or fears [for] our real possibilities, 
and we assess events incorrectly. The right [assessment of] events is the only 
sure way toward the future, and it is [a means of learning for future events]. 
It [gives us] the possibility to accept to negotiate or not, in [sight] of our 
cards and our real chances to win tricks with them.  
 
 Finally, Which are the limits of Bridge?, and How could we [overcome] these limi-
tations?  
  Bridge has […] limitations [that cannot be circumvented, whenever] 
there is […] [one or a combination of the following circumstances]: 
- The [object/s to negotiate do] not agree […] [with the aim/s of the 
negotiation. Application of Bridge requires that object/s and goal/s 
have the same internal structure, so that the same suits must repre-
sent their different aspects. An example of the opposite is: if we need 
to negotiate the price –money– to reach something different from 
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just more money, the issue and [the] objective [do] not have the same 
internal structure. On the contrary, if the case is negotiating the price 
–money– for a financial product, object and objective […] have the 
same internal structure]. 
- The power is very close to [one of the players]. In this case […] the 
best solution [could] be the Adjusted Winner Procedure, [since it] calcu-
lates issues and not relationships between [those] and the players. 
- […] Control over […] time and […] space. All changes [will alter the 
game], even [small ones]. […] An unexpected event [in] the last mi-
nute [may change it all after a very good preparation], even if we have 
done the calculus of gains and losses in connection with the different 
combinatorial possibilities. ([…] We should [prepare and] make [all 
the calculi] before getting into the negotiation […] because it is the 
only possibility to know how often [a] favourable scenario for negoti-
ating [will] take place). [Unexpected events are] much more common 
[than we] think, because […] negotiations are implemented [by] indi-
viduals, and individuals are [not 100% predictable].  This could be 
[overcome] with a [thorough] preparation [knowing that some uncer-
tainty will always remain –subjectivity is always there, it is intrinsic to 
the players, subjects themselves]. Briefly, Bridge applied […] [on] ne-
gotiations is an analysis about [whether the arguments we have can be tackled 
in the negotiation and about when to say what?] In case of doubt, we 
[should keep in mind this]: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one 
must be silent” (Wittgenstein, 1922, para. 7). 
 
[…] 
[The great limitation of the Bridge application on negotiations is, and will 
always be, subjectivity, which is present from the beginning of the process 
and is liable for two direct shadows, inherent to our own subjectivity, and 
for one indirect shadow, implicit in our interlocutor].  
[Direct shadows]:                         
[1.  To choose what arguments should be employed during the 
 negotiation]. 
[2. To assign to each argument the right card to symbolise it]. 
[Indirect shadow]: 
 [1. Even when trying to be as conscientious as possible during the 
negotiation process, we cannot guarantee what will be replied to 
our arguments, we cannot predict that]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Negotiating with a Logical–Linguistic Protocol in a Dialogical Framework 
 
   
[The next pages are meant to throw some light on each of the above 
shadows. The negotiator, as subject with subjectivity, is one of the necessary 
elements in a negotiation, so Shadows will definitely persist but they become 
lighter]. 
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ACT II: Neuro-Linguistic Patterns (NLP) 
 
As mentioned in the introductory pages, each act aims to be a part of a 
tragedy: a ‘conceptual mimesis’ of the used arguments, meant to produce a 
‘catharsis’, an improvement in the negotiation process. Thus, this act is our 
second step where our task will address to the limits, with the purpose to 
reduce them, to throw some light on the shadows. 
 
At this step the tool chosen to try to reduce the limitations has been 
Neuro-Linguistic Patterns (hereunder, NLP); NLP will be applied to the 
previously showed shadows. NLP have been selected because all the flaws 
in the negotiation process are a product of the negotiators’ weakness shown 
through their arguments. If we want to study flaws in arguments, we are in 
the field of NLP. 
 
Before starting this act, we would like to give two important remarks to 
tackle it: 
1.  We have just said above Neuro-Linguistic Patterns and not Neuro-
Linguistic Programming. Thus, when we talk about NLP we will only be 
talking about Patterns and not about Programs; a Program is just the 
effect of applying a Pattern. When we expound on an idea, this is 
always put into words, that is, in a formal grammar structure (Pat-
tern); this structure will produce a reaction, and at this moment the 
Pattern becomes a Program, as result of its implementation. The 
better we know Patterns –causes–, the better control we can have 
over unleashed Programs –effects–, that is, replies to the presented 
arguments –both the arguments and their replies can only be ex-
pressed in a Pattern. Nevertheless, subjectivity, so, unpredictability, 
will always remain. 
2.  We are only analysing Patterns, as the most strictly formal grammar 
structure, in order to know the natural unleashed Programs and to 
develop some sort of control of the possible replies. Patterns, like 
operative system foundations, are quite few and specific. Therefore, 
the length and depth of this act is restricted accordingly and in-
cludes only a handful of essential references. 
 
In the next pages, we will try to give an answer to the question: What 
can NLP possibly do to illuminate the limitations? Firstly, we will introduce NLP 
in order to decide whether they may be considered a useful tool to make 
rational decisions in the world of negotiations –Chapter 2.1. Right before 
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we deal with limitations under the light of NLP we will look at how are 
these Patterns operating in our mind –Chapter 2.2. To finish, we will look at 
the shadows under the light of NLP –Chapter 2.3. 
 
Chapter 2.1: Are NLP a useful tool to make rational decisions in the 
world of negotiations? 
In order to give an answer to this question, we should start by defining 
NLP:  
 
Neuro-Linguistic Programming (…) is the study of [Neuro-Linguistic Pat-
terns, of] how we think and communicate, with ourselves and with others, 
and how we can use this to get the results we want. (Centre of Excellence, 
2014a, p. 11) 
 
Therefore, reading this definition we can trust NLP are the right tool 
to reduce the limitations. However, when we go deeper in we discover that 
NLP are more about Programming than about Patterns. It is more focused 
on the techniques to put into practice and the results than on the structure 
of arguments themselves. Moreover, since its beginning, NLP focused in 
Programming; that is why there is a large amount of literature on NLP (P 
understood as Programming) applied on business (business meaning negotiation 
per se). This is not the interest of this study. This piece of research is not about how to 
say an argument (Programming) –in a semiotic meaning–; we are analysing how to 
build it, its structure –syntax– and the semantic implication of the syntax 
chosen (syntactic Pattern form) in addition to how it is taking place –
intonation– (pragmatic Pattern form), and what is behind the manifested 
form, what is hidden, as if modelling a precise syntax and its intonation for 
each argument. 
  
Now, we can agree that NLP (P understood as Patterns) are a useful 
tool to make decisions in the world of negotiations. Could NLP also be useful 
to make rational decisions? Yes, definitely, because we are keeping the P in NLP 
as Patterns, i.e., as syntax + ‘semantics of syntax in itself’16, as grammar in 
Montague’s meaning (cf. Montague, 1970, pp. 373-398), that is, we could 
consider Patterns as a Montague’s subset. Moreover, we know that the ra-
tional truth-value is in syntax, in accordance with: 
                                              
16 We are understanding semantics of syntax in itself as the representational value that the syntac-
tic form takes in our mind (e.g.: when we hear a conjunctive sentence, our mind considers 
every part of the conjunctive sentence is the case, meaning true).  
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-  If an elementary proposition is true, its negative mood will be false 
(taking the same sense as in classic Logic). 
-  For a true conjunctive sentence, each part of it must be true (taking 
the same sense as in classic Logic). 
-  For a true disjunctive sentence, at least one of its parts must be true 
(taking the same sense as in classic Logic). 
-  For a true conditional sentence, we consider only the case our mind 
takes as natural: if the antecedent is true –assumed to occur–, then 
the consequent will be also true.  
- Any true universal sentence or necessary sentence must be true for 
every case (taking the same sense as in classic Logic). 
- Any true particular (existential) sentence or possible sentence must be 
true at least for one case (taking the same sense as in classic Logic). 
If we are to be true as negotiators, then our sentences will be true sen-
tences. Therefore, their syntax will be in accordance with what has been said 
above. Thus, we can conclude that NLP are a useful tool to make rational 
decisions in the world of negotiations. 
 
Now we are almost ready to throw some light on the limitations sug-
gested at the end of the previous act. Right before engaging in limitations, 
we will look at how these Patterns work in our mind, what kind of Pro-
grams they are triggering. 
 
Chapter 2.2: How do Linguistic Patterns work in our mind?17  
Linguistic Patterns, syntactic expressions of thoughts, operate in two 
directions: 
 Toward us: When somebody is talking to us, we are doing linguistic 
assumptions. These assumptions are creating a new syntactic struc-
ture (the same or different from the original), meaning a new truth-
value, which could also be the same or different from the original 
truth-value in the mind of the speaker. This new truth-value is the 
one to which we will reply. As we cannot have control of the origi-
nal meaning in the mind of our interlocutor, we cannot be sure that 
our answer is really in accordance with what they18 have said. Nev-
                                              
17 Cf. Centre of Excellence, 2014a, pp. 55-71. 
18 For the sake of inclusive language, all 3rd person singular pronouns whose antecedent is a 
genderless person have been changed into the plural form (he and she for they, him and her for 
them, his and her for their and his and hers for theirs). 
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ertheless, we can learn a great lesson from this process: the same 
happens the other way round. 
 Toward our interlocutor. We cannot control the structure of our inter-
locutor’s speech but we can have a good command over our lan-
guage expression. To reach this command we need to assess pre-
suppositions, or rather, linguistic assumptions; they are basically: 
  Syntactic Patterns 
-  Using elementary propositions presupposes the existence 
of the entity to which they are applied. [Elementary propo-
sition, expressed by the symbol A]  
- Using conjunctive sentences presupposes that each one of 
them is the case. [Conjunctive sentence, α˄β] 
- Using or presupposes exclusion/inclusion. [Disjunctive sen-
tence, α∨β] 
-  Using the conditional structure, like if … then ... or similar, 
presupposes a cause and its effect. In fact, every cause–
effect can be represented as a conditional relationship. This 
is how our mind understands viscerally the conditional pat-
tern. Even when not every conditional sentence is a proper 
representation of the cause–effect relationship, a conditional 
sentence will produce a cause–effect pattern in our mind, that is, the 
antecedent is assumed to occur. [Conditional sentence, α→β] 
- Using quantifiers or modal operators presupposes necessity 
or possibility. [Universal, ∀xAx /Necessary, ⎕Aci sentence; 
or Particular, ∃xAx /Possible, ◊Aci sentence] 
-  Using negative sentences that are true, their affirmative 
mood will be false. But WARNING! Negative sentences 
that are a command –more or less explicit–, are tricky for 
our mind, which acts quite oddly: “(…) the mind cannot 
process a negative instruction, for example, if I say don’t 
think of the colour red, what comes to mind?” (Petruzzi, 
2012, p. 77). Therefore, “Suggestions which logically are 
negatives but create an internal representation which the 
unconscious acts on as a positive suggestion” (Centre of 
Excellence, 2014a, p. 69). Negative sentences under a ques-
tion form are also equivocal for our mind; in this case, our 
mind does not know whether the right answer is the affir-
mation for the negative question or its negative mood. 
[Negative sentence, α] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
M. Dolors Martínez-Cazalla   
 
 
 
  Intonation Patterns (pragmatic Pattern form) 
-  Question [ ? ] / Statement [ ! ] / Command [ ! ]. An argu-
ment is not only a sentence; an argument is a pronounced 
sentence. Thus, intonation is as important as the argument 
itself.  
 Special Pattern 
- Silence: “(…) silence can be interpreted as having meaning. 
(…) Our mind and body are part of the same system, so 
the thoughts we have affect our physiology, and it shows 
up in our non-verbal interactions” (Centre of Excellence, 
2014a, p. 20). Moreover, silence is the replacement of at 
least a word, or even the expression of a whole thought. 
We cannot be so naïve as to believe that silence is an empty 
set or an infinite set; silence is always the expression of at 
least one of the elements of a limited set of possible ele-
ments to take up that place, because silence encodes usually 
a finite number of replies to the question that triggered the 
silence. 
  
 So far, we have been speaking about the visible structure of Patterns. 
Patterns, we should realise, need to take place in a concrete expression 
(word/sentence + intonation + body expression, or silence + body expres-
sion); this is why we cannot overlook what is behind every concrete expres-
sion. In the farthest depths of every one of us are our beliefs and values –
hidden in the structure of the Patterns–; they are modelling our expressions, 
not only their content but also their form –syntax + intonation. Being aware 
of how beliefs and values are modelling expression forms (direct/indirect 
syntactic patterns/intonations/body language) is not easy (for instance, ori-
ental cultures would usually choose the indirect form), but it is the essential 
key to achieve rapport, so we should not disdain our interlocutor’s beliefs 
and values when evaluating the patterns that we are going to use. When 
communicating with somebody, we may know and/or share beliefs and val-
ues with them or not, but if we really want to communicate we will have to 
shape our expressions in a common territory to guarantee comprehension, 
to make sure our patterns are recognised. 
Knowing all that, we can make as many combinations, variations 
and/or permutations as we want. We can say, being right, that if we are 
aware of this, we will manage our arguments as good as possible in the de-
sired way; even when we “(…) don’t get dealt the best cards in life, though 
we have a choice in how we respond. And it is within our response that our 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Negotiating with a Logical–Linguistic Protocol in a Dialogical Framework 
 
   
lives are shaped” (Petruzzi, 2012, p. 29). Besides, the desired way cannot be 
manipulative because “(…) manipulative behaviour never works. Usually the 
other person will spot what the manipulator is trying to do because they 
seem ‘false’ or not fully human in their responses. (…) If you respect the 
other person and dovetail your desired outcome with theirs, you will get a 
win-win situation and everyone is satisfied. If not, neither party will achieve 
their outcome” (Centre of Excellence, 2014a, p. 29). 
 
Now it is the time to see whether it is possible to throw some light on 
the limitations suggested at the end of the previous act. 
 
Chapter 2.3: Shadows under the light of NLP 
  Here we go back to the question of the great limitation for the Bridge 
application on negotiations, as mentioned at the end of the previous act in 
Chapter 1.3, and look at it under NLP: Can NLP throw any light on the shad-
ows? We will go through the limitations one by one. 
 
 We will start by looking at the ones we named direct shadows, the ones 
inherent to our own subjectivity. 
1.  To choose what arguments should be employed during the negotia-
tion. 
As discussed earlier, we cannot be sure about what arguments, 
in the meaning of their content, should we choose. Nevertheless, 
we are responsible of choosing the best syntax, intonation and body 
language pattern, or the best silence and body language pattern, for 
each of the arguments. To do our best, we should always keep in 
mind where is the common territory of beliefs and values (our own 
and the interlocutor’s) and we should make the arguments be born 
there.  
At this moment, there is no doubt about a couple of things we 
have to take into account when we choose arguments to employ in 
a negotiation process: 
 Choosing arguments under a conditional form produces a 
cause–effect pattern in our mind, that is, the antecedent is 
assumed to occur. 
 When choosing arguments in negative mood, one must be 
extremely careful (as expounded in pages 30-31): 
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- In case they enclose a command: they will suggest the 
opposite –a positive order– in the mind of our inter-
locutor. 
- In case they are expressed as a question: our interlocu-
tor will feel confused to answer it. 
2. To assign to each argument the right card to symbolise it. 
We will never be one hundred per cent certain of having cho-
sen the right card, the one that best symbolises each argument. 
However, the better our knowledge of the common territory of be-
liefs and values, the better the connection, and therefore also the 
accuracy, between each argument and its symbol in a playing card.  
 
Regarding the indirect shadow, the one implicit in the subjectivity of our 
interlocutor, we cannot guarantee what will be replied to our arguments, we 
cannot predict it, so in this regard we may say that no light is coming in 
from NLP. We could only suspect that the replied arguments will probably 
come from the interlocutor’s beliefs and values, but we cannot be sure. In 
spite of that, a small light is on sight: we could suspect, with a high degree of 
certainty, which will be the formal grammar structure –syntax– chosen for 
each reply as result of the Program triggered for the previous argument ex-
pressed in a Pattern. Thus, to be attentive to building good argu-
ments (arguments expressed in a good ‘container expression form’ –pattern–) 
is extremely relevant. As has been shown, we can have much more control 
over the form than over its content, then our arguments need to be valid 
arguments (containing expressions of pertinent ideas), and they must also be 
good arguments –pertinent ideas 'wrapped' in a good pattern. 
 
Next act will be an attempt to pursue the first direct shadow and the indi-
rect shadow. For both, we will be going deeper in syntax, because syntax is the 
only rational pattern for an argument; therefore, syntax is the only discipline 
where we can predict the outcome and here we should do our best. 
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ACT III:  Cryptic Language: Russian Cards 
 
 As promised at the end of the previous act, in this one we will tackle 
deeper the syntactic patterns as a tool to decide what arguments should be 
chosen to employ during a negotiation, as well as to predict replies, both still 
in the darkness.  
 Along the next pages, we will try to give an answer to how to create right 
syntactic patterns which can cause good and predictable replies. Hence, we will analyse 
a cryptic language: Russian Cards. This language was developed by van 
Ditmarsch (Van Ditmarsch, van der Hoek, & Kooi, 2008, pp. 97-104 et 108) 
–Chapter 3.1. We will extract two key lessons from it –Chapter 3.2. Finally, 
a dialogical framework will throw some light on the darkness –Chapter 3.3. 
 
Chapter 3.1: Hunting Hackers. Is it useful to think like a ‘mute guest’ 
to prepare a negotiation talk thoroughly? 
This chapter deals with a cryptic language: Russian Cards. The original 
problem was proposed at the Moscow Mathematics Olympiad in 2000:  
 
Level C. Problem 6. Seven cards were drawn from a deck, shown to eve-
rybody, and shuffled. Then Greg and Linda were given three cards each, 
and the remaining card was either (a) hidden or (b) given to Pat. Greg and 
Linda take turns announcing information about their cards. Are they able 
to ultimately reveal their cards to each other in such a way that Pat cannot 
deduce the location of any card he doesn’t see? (No special code was set 
up in advance; all announcements are in “plain text”). (Fedorov, Belov, 
Kovaldzhi, & Yashchenko, 2011, p. 5) 
 
Thus we are inside a typical framework for a Dynamic Epistemic Logic 
–DEL. The progress of knowledge depends on the public announcements 
(cf. Van Ditmarsch et al., 2008, pp. 104-107) made by the knowledge sub-
jects involved –in our case: Greg, Linda and Pat. We can say Greg and Lin-
da are active knowledge subjects, and Pat is a passive one, like a ‘mute 
guest’.  
 
 Is the ‘mute guest’ a true passive knowledge subject or could he be a ‘hacker in dis-
guise’? The aim of this chapter is to answer this question. We will analyse the 
Russian Cards from Dialogical Semantics because our interest is to find out: 
What is happening in Pat’s mind? What is Pat thinking when he is listening to an-
nouncements from Greg and Linda? Notice that we are not yet using the word 
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knowledge for Pat, because the problem states: “Greg and Linda can exchange 
information about the hands they hold without Pat being able to deduce the 
owner of any card other than his own”. Our interest here is in the field of 
semantics, in the meaning of what is being said. Only at the end of this rea-
soning, we will get to know what has changed in Pat‘s knowledge. 
 For this analysis, we will take the Russian Cards problem developed by 
van Ditmarsch (Van Ditmarsch et al., 2008, pp. 97-104 et 108). First, we will 
tackle its dialogical semantics form for the general case. Then we will be 
ready to think what is happening in Pat’s mind in each one of the shown 
cases. Note that in the van Ditmarsch’s Russian Cards the names of the char-
acters have been changed: Greg is Ann (a), Linda is Bill (b) and Pat becomes 
Cath (c).  
A Dialogical Semantics19 for the Russian Cards20 
1.  Mathematical rules for the Russian Cards 
1.1.  Characteristics of the game: 
 We have three players: a; b; c. 
 We have a stack with seven different cards. They are numbered: 
0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6. 
 C = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} 
 The card deal for player ‘a’ and for player ‘b’ is the same: three 
cards each; player ‘c’ gets only one card.  
 The language assumes expressions in the form gR(m,n,p), that 
should be interpreted as player ‘g’ holds cards m; n; p. More pre-
cisely: aR(m, n, p); bR(m', n', p'); cR(m'') where m; n; p; m’; n’; 
p’; m’’ are numbers –not repeated– from 0 to 6.  
  In order to simplify the notation, we will follow the con-
vention used by van Ditmarsch, from whom expressions of the 
form aR(m, n, p) are taken: mnpa  and so on. 
1.2. Objective of the game: 
 The game has two parts and one objective: 
Part 1:  Players ‘a’ and ‘b’ interchange information about the cards 
they hold. 
                                              
19 Dialogical Semantics in the intuitionistic framework. For rules of intuitionistic Dialogical 
Semantics –points 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this section– cf. Rahman & Clerbout (2015) and Redmond 
& Fontaine (2011). 
20 Fulfilling correction and completeness within the Dialogical Epistemic Multi Agent Logic (DE-
MAL) framework. Cf. Magnier (2013), pp. 80-98. 
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Part 2:  After this sharing of information, player ‘c’ must be still ig-
norant, or in other words, they still know only their own 
card and do not know who has what. 
The language assumes expressions in the form Kg(mpng), that 
should be interpreted as player ‘g’ Knows that player ‘g’ holds cards m; n; 
p. Hence the objective of the game can be rendered with the following 
expression:  
[Ka(mnpa)˄Ka(m'n'p'b)]˄[Kb(m'n'p'b)˄Kb(mnpa)]˄[Kc(m''c)˄Kc(mnpa)˄ 
˄Kc(m'n'p'b)] that reads. 
1.3. Knowledge stage or terms of the game: 
 The 3 players (a; b; c) know that 7 cards have been dealt. They 
are not duplicated and they are numbered 0 to 6: C = {0, 1,.., 6} 
 The deal has been: C(a)37*C(b)34*C(c)11=aR(37); bR(34); cR(11)=140 
deals are possible. 
 After the deal the cards distribution has been: 012a; 345b; 6c. 
 At first, players know only their own cards. 
 Player ‘a’ and player ‘b’ have to let each other know the cards 
they hold without discovering them to player ‘c’. Player ‘c’ has to 
remain ignorant about who has what after their announcements 
(in accordance with the objective of the game –previous section: 
1.2.– and inside the framework of the Logic of public an-
nouncements). 
 
2. Particle rules (symbols taken as expressed in pages 30-31): 
 
Announcement structure 
 
Attack 
 
Defence 
!α˄β 
The attacker chooses      
the defence 
?L∧ (Left side of the 
conjunction) 
!α 
?R∧ (Right side of the 
conjunction) 
!β 
!α∨β 
The defender chooses    
the defence 
?∨ 
!α 
!β 
!α→β 
!α (α is assumed to 
occur) 
!β 
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!α 
 
!α 
 
--------- 
(No defence, only 
counterattack is 
possible) 
!∀xAx ?k (k is chosen by the attacker) !Ak 
!∃xAx 
?∃ (could you show 
me one, please?) 
!Ak (k is chosen by the 
defender) 
!⎕Aci 
?cj  <ciRcj> (cj is chosen by    
the attacker) 
!Acj 
!◊Aci 
?◊ (could you show 
me a case, please?) 
!Acj  <ciRcj> (cj is chosen 
by the defender) 
Note: ‘⎕’ and ‘◊’ will operate in the same way in all the cases where there is a modal 
operator: alethic, deontic, epistemic, doxastic, temporal or a combination of them. 
 
3. Structural rules for a game played in the intuitionistic Logic frame-
work: 
 Player ‘c’ always remains as ‘mute guest’. 
 The game starts with an assertion from player ‘a’. 
 By rotating turns, player ‘a’ first, then ‘b’, and again ‘a’ and ‘b’, make 
a public announcement, either as an assertion or as a question. 
 Each announcement –assertion or question– must be true. Each 
question must refer to a previous announcement. 
 Each announcement produces a new engagement that adds to the 
previous ones, making an engagement chain. No player can avoid 
their engagement chain.  
 No player can repeat an argument already attacked. If an argument 
is repeated, it will be because the player arrives to the same argu-
ment through a different way, for instance, from another hypothe-
sis. 
 Each announcement has to have a reply. It is not possible to leave 
an announcement without reply. At the end of the game each attack 
must be completed with its defence, unless: 
- The attack has been against a negative sentence. Then, no re-
ply, no defence, is possible. 
 Cf. Rahman & Clerbout, 2015, p. 68. 
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O Wins    
 
- The attack has been a double negative sentence. Negative sen-
tences can only be attacked one at a time because, as already 
mentioned, no player can avoid their engagement chain, so no 
player can say !A when they have already said !A (being A an 
elementary proposition). Therefore, faced with attacks con-
structed with double negative sentences, a double attack is not 
possible. 
 Cf. Rahman & Clerbout, 2015, p. 69. 
 O   P  
    ! AA 0 
1 ! A 0  --  
 --  1 ! A 2 
3 ! A 2  ----  
O Wins    
 
- The attack has been an elementary proposition and the re-
spondent does not have the possibility to reply the same ele-
mentary proposition.  
 Cf. Rahman & Clerbout, 2015, p. 66. 
 O   P  
    ! QaQb    0 
    1 ! Qa     0  ----  
O Wins    
 O   P  
    ! AA 0 
1 ? [AA] 0  ! A 2 
3 ! A 2  ----  
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 The best defence is a good attack. If we can choose between attacking 
and defending, in most instances we should attack first. 
 The game ends when ‘a’ knows b’s cards and vice versa, and ‘c’ re-
mains ignorant. 
 
4. Formalisation for the general case: 
 
Case 3.1 
    
OPPONENT (b) PROPONENT (a) 
 HYPOTHESIS THESIS  
H1 g≠g'≠c; g, g 'є{a, b} !(012a∨012b)→[(012a∨012b)∧(345a∨ 
∨345b)] 
 
0 
H2 C={0,1,2,3,4,5,6} 
H3 
 
mnpg →(mnpg'∨m'n'm''g'∨ 
∨n'p'm''g'∨m'p'm''g'∨m'n'p'g')  
H4 {m≠n≠p≠m'≠n'≠p'≠m''} є C 
H5 m''є{c} then m''c 
1 !(012a∨012b) 0  ![(012a∨012b)∧(345a∨345b)] 4 
3 !012a  1 ?∨ 2 
5 ?L∧ 4  !(012a∨012b) 6 
7 ?∨ 6  !012a 8 
9 ?R∧ 4  !(345a∨345b) 10 
11 ?∨ 10  !345b 20 
13 
![012g →(012g'∨346g'∨ 
∨456g'∨356g'∨345g')] 
 
(H4; 3) 
H3 
!m/0; n/1; p/2; m'/3; n'/4; 
p'/5; m''/6  
12 
15 
![012a→(012b∨346b∨ 
∨456b∨356b∨345b)] 
 
(H1) 
13 
!g/a; g'/b 14 
17 
!012b∨346b∨456b∨ 
∨356b∨345b) 
 15 !012a 16 
19 !345b  17 ?∨ 18 
 
Summary for case 3.1: ‘a’ holds 012 and ‘b’ holds 345 
 
Or: 
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Case 3.2 
 
OPPONENT (b) PROPONENT (a) 
 HYPOTHESIS THESIS  
H1 g≠g'≠c; g, g 'є{a, b} !(012a∨012b)→[(012a∨012b)∧(345a∨ 
∨345b)] 
 
0 
H2 C={0,1,2,3,4,5,6} 
H3 
 
mnpg’ →(mnpg∨m'n'm''g∨ 
∨n'p'm''g∨m'p'm''g∨m'n'p'g)  
H4 {m≠n≠p≠m'≠n'≠p'≠m''} є C 
H5 m''є{c} then m''c 
1 !(012a∨012b) 0  ![(012a∨012b)∧(345a∨345b)] 4 
3 !012b  1 ?∨ 2 
5 ?L∧ 4  !(012a∨012b) 6 
7 ?∨ 6  !012b 8 
9 ?R∧ 4  !(345a∨345b) 10 
11 ?∨ 10  !345a 20 
13 
![012g’ →(012g∨346g∨ 
∨456g∨356g∨345g)] 
 
(H4; 3) 
H3 
!m/0; n/1; p/2; m'/3; n'/4; 
p'/5; m''/6  
12 
15 
![012b→(012a∨346a∨ 
∨456a∨356a∨345a)] 
 
(H1) 
13 
!g/a; g'/b 14 
17 
!012a∨346a∨456a∨ 
∨356a∨345a) 
 15 !012b 16 
19 !345a  17 ?∨ 18 
 
Summary for case 3.2: ‘a’ holds 345 and ‘b’ holds 012 
 
5. Interpretation keys: 
 External columns contain the intervention order, that is, the num-
ber of game moves. 
 The number of move that is being attacked is placed in the internal 
double column. Numbers on the left mean the opponent is attack-
ing a move from the proponent [e.g.: move 1 (opponent) is attack-
ing move 0 (proponent)]; numbers on the right mean the proponent 
is attacking a move from the opponent [e.g.: move 2 (proponent) is 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
M. Dolors Martínez-Cazalla   
 
 
 
attacking move 1 (opponent)]. Numbers in brackets above the at-
tacked move number mean: “Based on what you said in move x or 
in your hypothesis y, I can attack you, as I am doing now” [e.g.: 
move 14 (proponent) is attacking move 13 (opponent), their attack 
based on Hypothesis 1 (H1)]. 
 The central columns contain announcements: centre left are the 
opponent’s announcements and centre right are the proponent’s. 
 Each announcement is preceded by a sign:  
!: This means that the announcement is an assertion.  
Assertions are the pragmatic form of an attack or of a defence. 
?: This means that the announcement is a question about a previous 
announcement and therefore, it does not introduce into the dia-
logue any new datum of knowledge. 
Questions are the pragmatic form of an attack. 
 Each row comprises 6 boxes (from left to right):  
1.  Box for the number of the opponent’s move. 
2.  Box for the opponent’s announcement (attack or defence under 
the form of a question or an assertion). 
3. Box for the number of move attacked by the opponent to the 
proponent –if this is the case. 
4.  Box for the number of move attacked by the proponent to the 
opponent –if this is the case. 
5.  Box for the proponent’s announcement (attack or defence under 
the form of a question or an assertion). 
6.  Box for the number of the proponent’s move. 
 Box 2 and box 5 must be coordinated: if box 2 is an attack, then 
box 5 must be its defence (which does not necessarily have to be 
the next move). Thus, we will have an attack and its defence on the 
same row, and it is not relevant if the defence is the next move or if 
it happens many moves after the attack (e.g.: move 11 is an attack 
by the opponent to move 10 of the proponent. This attack is de-
fended –replayed– on proponent’s move 20). Therefore, each new 
attack must be placed in a new row in order to keep its defence box 
empty.  
 
6. Practical cases:  
 Once we have dealt with the semantics for the general case, we should 
tackle the cases proposed by van Ditmarsch one by one, following the con-
vention used by himself (Exercise 4.72 ff., p. 103). This will help us answer 
the question we proposed: Is the ‘mute guest’ a true passive knowledge subject or 
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could they be a ‘hacker in disguise’? To accomplish this we are not going to for-
malise each case in its dialogical semantics form. There is no need to repeat 
it for each case, once we know how Dialogical Semantics works, because 
our interest is in the hidden column, the one for the ‘mute guest’, Cath (c). 
Therefore, we will hear the announcements as ‘c’ would listen to them and 
we will imagine what kind of reflections would be happening in her mind. 
 
Exercise 4.72 (A five hand solution): Assume deal of cards 012.345.6. 
Show that the following is a solution: Anne announces: “I have one of 
{012, 034, 056, 135, 246}” and Bill announces “Cath has card 6”.  
 
Bill (b) opponent Ann (a) proponent Cath (c) ‘mute guest’ 
2 !6c !(012a∨034a∨056a∨135a∨246a) 1 ??? 
 
What is ‘c’ thinking after a’s and b’s announcements? 
1. How did ‘b’ know I have card 6? 
2. If ‘b’ said 6 and no other out of the four possible cards, those ones 
that ‘b’ does not have, must be because: 
2.1.  In triads announced by ‘a’ where card 6 is there must be also at 
least one of b’s cards so that ‘b’ can recognise these triads as 
not a’s triads. Therefore, ‘a’ will never have any binomial ac-
companying card 6.   
2.2.  Besides, each one of the triads mentioned in 2.1. should also 
guarantee the safety of the announcement, since no player 
should be inside the ‘truth zone’ of another one (you can only 
have total control of your ‘truth zone’). To be sure not to tres-
pass another player’s ‘truth zone’, the only possible solution, 
for our case, is to include only one real card number of the an-
nouncer in each one of these triads. 
2.3.  ‘c’ summarises her reasoning: In the triads where 6 is, there is 
also a card from ‘b’ (as seen in 2.1.). Thanks to this, ‘b’ knows 
these triads as not a’s triads. These triads contain also one of a’s 
cards to guarantee the safety of the announcement (as seen in 
2.2.). 
3.   Thus, ‘c’ removes these triads from a’s announcement, and the re-
sult is a ‘new’ a’s announcement in c’s mind: !(012a∨034a∨135a). 
4.  ‘c’ asks herself what is a’s hand. To answer, she will be doing the 
following reasoning: 
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 4.1.  In the triads where 6 is (056; 246), there is also one card of ‘a’ 
and another of ‘b’, so: 
a = 0; 2 then b = 5; 4 
a = 5; 4 then b = 0; 2 
a = 0; 4 then b = 5; 2 
a = 5; 2 then  b = 0; 4 
4.2. Next step in c’s reasoning is comparing these binomials to the 
three triads remaining in c’s mind (as seen in point 3): 
012a∨034a∨135a. The result is that either ‘a’ holds 012 or 034, 
therefore ‘a’ holds 0 and ‘b’ must hold either 54 or 52, so ‘b’ 
holds 5. None of these binomials allows ‘a’ to hold 135, so this 
triad is no more an option. Therefore, ‘c’ knows ‘a’ must have 
012a∨034a. 
4.3. Now, ‘c’ compares the possible a’s binomials to the triads con-
taining card 6 (056; 246) looking for more information. 
012 to 056: as ‘b’ said ‘c’ holds 6, and ‘c’ knows already ‘b’ 
holds 5 and ‘a’ holds 0.  
034 to 056: This is the same case as above. 
012 to 246: as ‘b’ said ‘c’ holds 6, and ‘c’ knows ‘a’ holds 
0, and 0 should be together with 2 or with 4. For this case 
‘c’ would think ‘a’ holds 2 and  ‘b’ holds 4.  
034 to 246: This is the opposite of the previous case. 
Here ‘c’ would think ‘a’ holds 4 and ‘b’ holds 2.  
After this reasoning, we can conclude that nothing new can be 
known. ‘c’ arrives to the same conclusion as in the previous 
point: ‘a’ must have 012a∨034a. Therefore, the reasoning of ‘c’ 
should conclude at the previous step (4.2.). Nothing else is 
necessary. 
 
 c’s final state of knowledge is: 
012a∨034a 
a = 0; 2   then  b = 5; 4  Therefore 012a and 543b  
Or 
a = 0; 4  then   b = 5; 2  Therefore 034a and 521b 
 As the deal has been: C(a)37*C(b)34*C(c)11 = aR(37); bR(34); cR(11)=140 
deals are possible. At the beginning, ‘c’ knows she holds card 6, so the pos-
sible deals are only the ones where ‘c’ holds card 6, therefore there are 20 
possible deals: C(a)36*C(b)33 = aR(36); bR(33)=20. In fact, Cath is only hesitat-
ing between two possible deals [(012a∧543b)∨(034a∧521b)], thus ‘c’ knows 18 
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deals are not possible. If 20 unknown deals mean ‘c’ is 100% ignorant, then 
2 unknown deals mean ‘c’ is 10% ignorant. In this case, Cath has reached 
90% of knowledge, according to the possible deals, and 33.3333% of 
knowledge of the composition of each possible deal because ‘c’ knows one 
card from ‘a’ (0) and one from ‘b’ (5) as seen in point 4.2.  
Total c’s knowledge is 93.3333%   Total c’s ignorance is 6.6667% 
 
 
Exercise 4.73 (A six hand solution): Assume deal of cards 012.345.6. 
Show that the following is a solution: Anne announces: “I have one of 
{012, 034, 056, 135, 146, 236}” and Bill announces “Cath has card 6”.  
 
Bill (b) opponent Ann (a) proponent 
Cath (c) 
 ‘mute guest’ 
2 !6c !(012a∨034a∨056a∨135a∨146a∨236a) 1 ??? 
 
What is ‘c’ thinking after a’s and b’s announcements? 
1.  How did ‘b’ know I have card 6? 
2.  If ‘b’ said 6 and no other out of the four possible cards, those ones 
‘b’ does not have, must be because: 
2.1.  In triads announced by ‘a’ where card 6 is there must be also at 
least one of b’s cards so that ‘b’ can recognise these triads as 
not a’s triads. Therefore, ‘a’ will never have any binomial ac-
companying card 6.   
2.2.  Besides, each one of the triads mentioned in 2.1. should also 
guarantee the safety of the announcement, since no player 
should be inside the ‘truth zone’ of another one (you can only 
have total control of your ‘truth zone’). To be sure not to tres-
pass another player’s ‘truth zone’, the only possible solution, 
for our case, is to include only one real card number of the an-
nouncer in each one of these triads. 
2.3.  ‘c’ summarises her reasoning: In the triads where 6 is, there is 
also a card from ‘b’ (as seen in 2.1.). Thanks to this, ‘b’ knows 
these triads as not a’s triads. These triads contain also one of a’s 
cards to guarantee the safety of the announcement (as seen in 
2.2.). 
3.  Thus, ‘c’ removes these triads from a’s announcement, and the re-
sult is a ‘new’ a’s announcement in c’s mind: !(012a∨034a∨135a). 
4.  ‘c’ asks herself what is a’s hand? To answer, she will be doing the 
following reasoning: 
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4.1. In the triads where 6 is (056; 146; 236), there is also one card 
of ‘a’ and another of ‘b’, so: 
a = 0; 1; 2 then  b = 5; 4; 3 
 a = 5; 4; 3 then b = 0; 1; 2 
a = 0; 1; 3 then b = 5; 4; 2 
 a = 5; 4; 2 then b = 0; 1; 3 
 a = 0; 4; 3 then b = 5; 1; 2 
 a = 5; 1; 2 then b = 0; 4; 3 
 a = 0; 4; 2 then b = 5; 1; 3 
 a = 5; 1; 3 then b = 0; 4; 2 
4.2. Next step in c’s reasoning is comparing the above triads (4.1.) 
to the three triads remaining in c’s mind (as seen in point 3): 
012a∨034a∨135a. The result is that every one of them is possi-
ble because all are compatible with the condition to include 
one card from ‘a’ + one card from ‘b’ + card 6.  
  
 c’s final state of knowledge is: 
012a∨034a∨135a 
a = 0; 1; 2  then b = 5; 4; 3  Therefore 012a and 543b  
Or 
a = 0; 3; 4  then b = 5; 1; 2  Therefore 034a and 512b 
     (0; 4; 3) 
Or 
a = 1; 3; 5  then b = 0; 4; 2  Therefore 135a and 042b 
     (5; 1; 3) 
As the deal has been: C(a)37*C(b)34*C(c)11 = aR(37); bR(34); cR(11)=140 
deals are possible. At the beginning, ‘c’ knows she holds card 6, so now the 
possible deals are only the ones where ‘c’ holds card 6, therefore there are 
20 possible deals: C(a)36*C(b)33 = aR(36); bR(33)=20. In fact, Cath is only hesi-
tating among three possible deals [(012a∧543b)∨(034a∧125b)∨(135a∧042b)], 
thus ‘c’ knows 17 deals are not possible. If 20 unknown deals mean ‘c’ is 
100% ignorant, then 3 unknown deals mean ‘c’ is 15% ignorant. In this case, 
Cath has reached 85% of knowledge. In this instance ‘c’ cannot reach more 
knowledge because no card is common to all three of a’s possible deals. 
Total c’s knowledge is 85%  Total c’s ignorance is 15% 
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Exercise 4.74 (A seven hand solution): Assume deal of cards 012.345.6. 
Show that the following is a solution: Anne announces: “I have one of 
{012, 034, 056, 135, 146, 236, 245}” and Bill announces “Cath has card 6”.  
 
Bill (b)         
opponent 
Ann (a) proponent 
Cath (c) 
‘mute guest’ 
2 !6c !(012a∨034a∨056a∨135a∨146a∨236a∨245a) 1 ??? 
 
What is ‘c’ thinking after a’s and b’s announcements? 
 Now, after doing the previous exercises, ‘c’ has reached a quite refined 
method. She knows the procedure is: 
 1.  To take off the triads where her card, 6, is. Then, for this case, the 
‘new’ a’s announcement, in c’s mind, would be: 
   !(012a∨034a∨135a∨245a). 
2.  She also knows it is not necessary to do step 4.3. After doing it for 
the first exercise, she considers it useless. 
3.  Once she knows how the ‘new’ a’s announcement looks (an an-
nouncement that does not contain her card in any triad), she needs 
to compare the resultant possible (a-b)’s  deals to the announced 
triads containing 6, her card. 
  (a-b)’s possible pairs, according to a’s announcement are: 
  a = 0; 1; 2 then  b = 3; 4; 5 
  a = 0; 3; 4 then b = 1; 2; 5 
  a = 1; 3; 5 then b = 0; 2; 4 
  a = 2; 4; 5 then b = 0; 1; 3 
 
 After comparing a’s possible deals to the triads including 6 (056; 146; 
236) no new knowledge is gained, because all of a’s possible deals are com-
patible with the condition for triads with card 6 (one card from ‘a’ + one 
card from ‘b’ + the card from ‘c’ –card 6). Thus, final c’s state of knowledge 
is:  
 012a∨034a∨135∨245a 
 a = 0; 1; 2 then b = 3; 4; 5 Therefore 012a and 345b  
Or 
a = 0; 3; 4 then b = 1; 2; 5  Therefore 034a and 125b 
Or 
a = 1; 3; 5 then b = 0; 2; 4  Therefore 135a and 024b 
Or 
a = 2; 4; 5 then b = 0; 1; 3  Therefore 245a and 013b 
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As the deal has been: C(a)37*C(b)34*C(c)11 = aR(37); bR(34); cR(11)=140 
deals are possible. At the beginning, ‘c’ knows she holds card 6, so now the 
only possible deals are the ones where c holds 6, therefore there are 20 pos-
sible deals: C(a)36*C(b)33 = aR(36); bR(33)=20. However, Cath knows only four 
deals are possible [(012a∧345b)∨(034a∧125b)∨(135a∧024b)∨(245a∧013b)], 
thus ‘c’ knows 16 deals are not possible. If 20 unknown deals mean ‘c’ is 
100% ignorant, then 4 unknown deals mean ‘c’ is 20% ignorant. In this case, 
Cath has reached 80% of knowledge. In this instance ‘c’ cannot reach more 
knowledge because no card is common to all four of a’s possible deals. 
Total c’s knowledge is 80%  Total c’s ignorance is 20% 
 
At this point we assume we are ready to deal with the question regard-
ing the ‘mute guest’, because the rest of the proposed exercises by van 
Ditmarsch do not appear to be relevant any more now that we know the 
method, so its application will be similar every time. Even increasing the 
difficulty of the algorithm –that is, increasing equally the number of cards 
for players ‘a’ and ‘b’ while ‘c’ stays with one (3:3:1; 4:4:1; …; n:n:1), or in 
ascending arithmetic progression in which the difference in number of cards 
between players ‘a’-‘b’ and ‘c’ is -2 (3:3:1; 4:4:2; …; n:n:n-2)–, the method 
would be applied in the same way:  
- For the first case, (3:3:1; 4:4:1; …; n:n:1), one of the announced ar-
rays must be the proponent’s deal and the rest must contain at least 
one and a maximum of n-2 elements –cards– from the proponent’s 
deal, to keep always place for a minimum of one and a maximum of 
two cards from ‘b’, or one from ‘b’ and one from ‘c’.  
- For the second case, (3:3:1; 4:4:2; …; n:n:n-2), one of the announced 
arrays must be the proponent’s deal and the rest must contain: only one 
element –card– from the proponent’s deal to be sure that at least one 
card from ‘b’ is always included in each one of them. 
What will change for each particular case is the dimension of the arrays 
–which must always 1xn, being ‘n’ the size of the deal for (a-b)– and the 
number of  announced arrays needed to keep the announcement safe. 
 
 Thus, the question would be whether the ‘mute guest’ is a true passive knowledge 
subject or a ‘hacker in disguise’. We think the answer is quite clear. As far as the 
‘mute guest’ is really mute but not deaf, we cannot be so arrogant as to think 
that the ‘mute guest’ is not thinking about what they are hearing. We can 
never assert that they are just hearing and not listening. If they are listening, 
they could be thinking about it. If they are thinking, they will then reach 
some amount of knowledge; they can be passive (hearing and not listening, 
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then not thinking) or not, that is nothing but their choice. So, a ‘mute guest’ 
is not a real passive knowledge subject because of being mute. 
Therefore, the chance to have a ‘hacker in disguise’ hidden as the ‘mute 
guest’ is quite high because: the hacker’s performance is just to be hidden; to 
be ‘mute’ while others are talking; listening and not just hearing; gathering 
information from the others during the information exchanges; thinking 
why something is said and not something else, or in another words. Then, if 
flaws are found (flaws meaning information leaks, the information which is said 
in an unsafe form –including silence), they may decide to start the attack or 
not. Professional attacks are not done at random, they are done with some 
degree of previous knowledge, and knowledge about others is only obtained 
from themselves. The hacker’s job is no other than catching the leaking in-
formation and taking advantage of it, using it to conduct a more effective 
attack. We must be careful, since even when information is passed in a safe 
form, we cannot be sure that there is no information leaking. Information is 
information anyway; even silence provides information, because silence en-
codes usually a finite number of replies to the question that triggered the 
silence (as already seen in the previous act). Thus, a ‘mute guest’ is not the 
best guest when you want to pass information without being recorded.  
 Anyway, the existence of ‘mute guests’ enhances the argumentative ca-
pacities of the negotiator, they are required to do their announcements as 
correctly as possible (both in quality and safety). Being forced to work under 
such high standards, a ‘mute guest’ could be the best coach for a negotiator. 
In the next chapter we will refer to two relevant lessons learned from the 
‘mute guest’, addressed to improving negotiating capacities. 
 
Chapter 3.2: Two lessons from the ‘mute guest’ 
Being coached as an negotiator in the presence of a ‘mute guest’, a po-
tential hacker, helps us know what and why are they thinking based on our 
announced arguments; therefore we can enhance our way of communi-
cating, improve the structure of our announcements –their quality and safe-
ty– from the point of view of a syntactic pattern in which the content is ex-
pressed. A potential hacker is the best mirror we can have; by observing 
them we can learn a great deal about potential flaws in the negotiation we 
are preparing, because a hacker is nothing but the worst opponent. 
 
The two great lessons from the ‘mute guest’ are the following: 
1.  The potential hacker starts thinking ‘hard’ against us when we 
directly trespass their ‘truth zone’ (e.g.: Bill announces: “Cath 
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has card 6”). When somebody feels their ‘truth zone’ directly 
trespassed, the natural reaction is to think: Why do they say that? 
How can they know? Everybody’s ‘truth zone’ is the core of their 
comfort zone, and nobody likes it to be trespassed, and much 
less so with a direct allusion. When somebody feels overstepped, 
they feel in danger. Then there are only two possible reactions: 
either fighting back against this invasion –and the negotiation 
process is automatically stopped–, or transforming this unin-
tended direct attack into the hardest counterattack we can expect 
because, as we have seen in the previous chapter, announcing 
our opponent’s truth is the least safe we can do, it is the most 
revealing action we can make, it shows much more of our ‘truth 
zone’ than talking about our proper truth, as Ann did in her an-
nouncement.  
Thus, this is the first lesson: The ‘mute guest’ says: “Do not 
touch me, please, or at least not shamelessly”. That is, if you want 
to remain safe when negotiating, you must be aware that you are on-
ly speaking the truth, because a lie may be the hacker’s truth, and 
then the hacker will be able to deduce what you want to conceal. 
2.  Their second lesson is in correspondence with the previous one. 
Now we know that it is not safe to trespass our opponent’s 
‘truth zone’ directly, then How will we be able to attack and remain 
safe? The best plausible way would be to create our replies to the 
proponent’s announcements following a similar pattern to the 
one that we would use to reply a partner in the presence of a 
hacker. The question is how Bill could answer Ann and not in-
crease Cath’s already acquired knowledge (from Ann’s an-
nouncement). The way to do it is just the one we use naturally 
when we give information not to be understood by a third per-
son: we usually reply repeating the same pattern used before, like 
going along with the same –but it is not quite the same–, for instance, 
Ann announces: “I have one of {012, 034, 056, 135, 146, 236, 
245}”, then Bill’s reply could be just the inverse of the part of 
announcement already caught by Cath. Thus, Bill’s reply could 
be: “I have one of {543, 125, 056, 042, 146, 236, 013}”. This 
would add nothing to Cath’s knowledge: 
 a = 0; 1; 2 then b = 5; 4; 3 Therefore 012a and 543b  
Or 
 a = 0; 3; 4 then b = 1; 2; 5  Therefore 034a and 125b 
Or 
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 a = 1; 3; 5 then b = 0; 4; 2  Therefore 135a and 042b 
Or 
 a = 2; 4; 5 then b = 0; 1; 3  Therefore 245a and 013b 
Therefore, 
[Ka(mnpa)˄Ka(m'n'p'b)]˄[Kb(m'n'p'b)˄Kb(mnpa)]˄[Kc(m''c)˄Kc(mnpa)˄Kc(m'n'p'b)] 
                                                                                         
This is not exactly so; however, Cath 
has no more knowledge than she ac-
quired after Ann’s announcement. 
Thus, this is the second lesson: If you want to remain safe from 
the opponent’s attack, when you are continuing with an argument 
you must create a new piece of information following the same pat-
tern used before.  
We cannot be so naïve as to believe that we will not touch the ‘truth 
zone’/comfort zone of our opponent when we are negotiating. We should 
not undervalue our opponent, and we should prepare the negotiation as if it 
were a struggle against an intelligent hacker; by doing so, we will do the best 
we possibly can to stay safe. 
 
It is time to check whether some more light has been thrown on the 
darkness. 
 
Chapter 3.3: A Dialogical Framework. A light in the darkness 
 As we said in the beginning of this act, our main aim here is to throw 
some light on the darkness; maybe the dark part could be reduced. 
 Direct shadows:  
- What arguments to choose. We could definitely say that we cannot 
be completely sure about what arguments, in the meaning of 
their content, should be chosen for a negotiation. However, 
now we know how to choose the best structure (syntactic pat-
tern) for arguments, since we have learned it from the Dialogi-
cal Semantics. 
- To assign to each argument the right card to symbolise it. Nothing else 
can be said, as already discussed in page 33.  
 Indirect shadow:  
- Subjectivity of the interlocutor. We cannot guarantee what will be 
replied to our arguments. We cannot predict their content. 
However, in the light of this dialogical framework we can now 
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predict the most plausible/logical syntactic structure for each 
reply. Thus, we will be able to know how the agreement could 
be, depending on the syntactic structure of the proponent’s 
first announcement.  
It is definitely better to be the proponent, since they hold the reins of 
the negotiation dialogue. Nevertheless, this is not always the case: when 
somebody is coming to see you, good manners usually require asking them 
first. For this case, different negotiation scenarios have to be prepared be-
cause, even if you are able to guess what your opponent will say, you are 
never sure until they start the discussion. Besides, during a negotiation pro-
cess the positions –proponent/opponent– are interchangeable, depending 
on the matter being discussed at the moment. 
In any case, it is always better to use the dialogical semantics form that 
is the most favourable to us. Therefore, when we are acting as proponent, 
we will be able to predict our defence, and then it will be preferable to 
choose from structures in green in the table next page, in order to build our 
arguments without giving weapons to our opponent –structures in red in the 
table. 
As a rule, it can be said that it is better to make announcements under a 
disjunctive form, a particular form, a possible form, or a combination of 
them. Moreover, in the specific case of a conditional announcement, it is not 
possible to have it under a completely literal expression: literal antecedent 
and literal consequent, understanding literal as an elementary proposition or 
its negative mood; at least one of them –antecedent or consequent– must be 
non-literal. In any case, the best choice is to use: 
-  The consequent under one of these forms we mentioned just above, 
because then we will receive a ‘favourable’ attack, since these are the 
cases where the defender has the choice; and  
- The antecedent as an elementary proposition, a conjunctive form, a 
universal form, a necessary form or a combination of them, because 
then we will be able to fight back –once our conditional has been at-
tacked, since these are the cases where the attacker has the choice.  
Finally, it should always be kept in mind the way in which negative sen-
tences work in our mind (pp. 30-31). We should be extremely careful about 
this because, in intuitionistic Logic, no defence is possible after a negative 
sentence has been said and attacked (pp. 37-38).  
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Dialogical Semantics Form 
 
 
Announcement structure 
 
Attack 
 
Defence 
X !α˄β 
The attacker chooses     
the defence 
Y ?L∧ (Left side of   
the conjunction) 
X !α 
Y ?R∧ (Right side of 
the conjunction) 
X !β 
X !α∨β 
The defender chooses    
the defence 
Y ?∨ 
X !α 
X !β 
X !α→β 
Y !α (α is assumed to 
occur) 
X !β 
 
X !α 
 
Y !α 
 
--------- 
(No defence, only 
counterattack is 
possible) 
X !∀xAx Y ?k (k is chosen by the attacker) X !Ak 
X !∃xAx 
Y ?∃ (could you show 
me one, please?) 
X !Ak (k is chosen by        
the defender) 
X !⎕Aci 
Y ?cj  <ciRcj> (cj is chosen by  
the attacker) 
X !Acj 
X !◊Aci 
Y ?◊ (could you show 
me a case, please?) 
X !Acj  <ciRcj> (cj is 
chosen by the defender) 
Player X: Opponent or Proponent Player Y: Opponent or Proponent 
Note: ‘⎕’ and ‘◊’ will operate in the same way in all the cases where there is a modal 
operator: alethic, deontic, epistemic, doxastic, temporal or a combination of them. 
 
We have gone deeper in syntax and extracted a pattern to make an-
nouncements (attacks or defences). Other than that, there is nothing else in 
a rational framework, which may throw light on our shadows.  
 
Through this research, we have been able to clarify some dark aspects 
of the negotiation process. Now, in the next section –Conclusion– we will 
propose a protocol to deal with negotiations. 
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CONCLUSION: Negotiating with a Logical-Linguistic Protocol         
in a Dialogical Framework 
 
 In the beginning of this work we said that this was an attempt to think 
how to create logical dialogues to tackle negotiations, meaning solving con-
flicts from basic linguistic structures (conjunctions, disjunctions, condition-
als) placed under a dialogue form as a cognitive system which ‘understands’ 
natural language and where there is a permanent feedback between both.  
 Now it is time to know whether this can be done and how to do it. 
This Conclusion will show a possible map, a guide to choose the order of 
arguments in negotiations with the aim to reach the highest intersection 
point between the optimization function and the satisfaction function. Since 
all negotiations start with a decision –the decision of negotiating about 
something– and as the rationality of the decision remains in the side of ob-
jectivity, that is, in optimization, we will offer in this section a sort of proto-
col that –we consider– could be useful to reach that aim. As a result, satis-
faction will increase in a direct proportion and we will be able to reach a 
high intersection point.  
A protocol for negotiating in a dialogical framework 
 As it is not possible to negotiate in a non-dialogical framework, here 
we are not taking ‘dialogical’ in its strict sense as in logical semantics –
although that sense is also included–, that is why it is written between quota-
tion marks. We want to remark that no negotiation process could exist with-
out dialogue, since dialogue is the only form under which a negotiation can 
take place, can be feasible. Therefore, we will offer here a sort of path to 
deal with it. For that purpose, we can imagine the different steps a negotia-
tion could go through before sitting at the negotiation table, and how a cor-
rect negotiation could be prepared: 
1.  Getting as much information about the subject (object/s and 
goal/s) as we are able to obtain.  
2.  Analysing every piece of information, even the very small ones. All 
of them are crucial for preparing a right negotiation process. The 
more we can understand what, how and why is happening, the better 
will be the protocol we will design to tackle the negotiation and the 
better the arguments we will choose to deal with it. 
[Point 1 and 2 are the grounds: the better they are done, the more solid the 
negotiation arenas in these two directions: to reach success and to analyse it 
afterwards in order to learn for future negotiations. In this work, these 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Negotiating with a Logical–Linguistic Protocol in a Dialogical Framework 
 
   
points are represented in the Annex, a past case because, as we already said, 
future cases cannot possibly prove a hypothesis. We needed to test this pro-
tocol in a completed case in order to know its potential for future cases]. 
 
3.  Assessing whether the object/s to negotiate have the same internal 
structure as the objective/s, that is, the issue/s are in strict corre-
spondence to the goal/s (an illustrative example was given in pages 
24-25). 
4.  Evaluating where is the power, how close to a particular negotiator 
it is.  
5. Knowing whether the scenario is stable enough, whether we have 
control over the negotiation time and space, or whether they are ra-
ther unpredictable. 
[If points 3, 4 and 5 are favourable to us –goal/s have the same internal 
structure as the issue/s to negotiate in order to reach it/them, power is not 
clearly on one side, and the arenas are solid enough–, then we will be ready 
to follow the path we are proposing here. If this is not the case, then we will 
not be able to continue on this path, as shown in pages 24-25]. 
 
6.  Taking points 3, 4 and 5 as favourable, it is time to make the whole 
list of the arguments, including the interlocutor’s arguments (of 
course we cannot know them in advance, but we need to imagine 
the scenario by making plausible suppositions). At the moment, we 
are paying attention only to the content of arguments; the structure 
in which they will be expressed is not relevant yet. In order to choose 
the content it will be a great help to know as precisely as possible 
the beliefs and values of our interlocutor. That will be an invaluable 
help to build a common territory of beliefs and values in which the 
arguments will be born (pp. 31-32).  
7.  Classifying the arguments according to the different aspects shared 
by the issue/s and the goal/s. In our case –Camp David Accords, as 
an international negotiation– four aspects can be identified: politi-
cal, financial, social, and cultural (obviously, this has to be adapted 
for every negotiation area). 
8. Placing in order the classed arguments according to their im-
portance, from highest to lowest, in every selected aspect. 
9.  Translating the arguments (unquantifiable values) into Bridge cards 
(countable values). So, if we decide, for our case, that spades repre-
sent the political aspect, then the most relevant argument will be-
come the Ace of spades, and so on (pp. 15-20). 
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10. Playing a Bridge hand (pp. 20-22).  
  The objection that a negotiator will not be able to use this protocol 
unless they can play Bridge, is easy to overcome, since there is a 
computer program that works the opposite way: it chooses the deal 
and it makes the game. At this moment, the algorithm supporting 
the program has not been developed to its maximum. However, it 
should be possible to enhance it because Bridge is just mathematics 
(cf. Borel & Chéron, 2009), and a Bridge computer program proto-
type has already been created and is running –you may take a look 
at the Bridge Base Online (BBO) website: 
http://www.bridgebase.com/ and see how the robot-player works. 
Once the algorithm is working one way, it will also be possible that 
it works in the opposite direction. The reverse option is not availa-
ble, because, for a Bridge player, that will be the antithesis of the 
game: if you know the result in advance, then what to play for? 
11.  Analysing what happened during the game (pp. 16-22). This means, 
to undo the game in order to know how the arguments have been 
played, discovering the pairs. That will provide a key on what is a 
win, what is a loss, and what card does not have a correlative argu-
ment –in case one player holds one suit longer than the other play-
er. For this case, it is better to disregard all the non-correlative ar-
guments when the negotiation takes place, because it is not elegant 
to ask somebody something they do not have an answer for, and it 
is also quite impolite to change the subject when being questioned. 
[Act I is the main frame for points 3 to 11]. 
 
 This protocol still needs to be improved. There is excessive subjectivity 
in the choice of arguments. The quality of the optimization function should 
be increased while avoiding subjectivity as much as possible, in order to 
guarantee a good ratio of satisfaction as a result of a well done optimization. 
 12.  Paying attention to the structure –syntax– of the arguments, since 
negotiating is not throwing one card on top of another on a table. 
Negotiation means dialogue, and so, countless variables. Once we 
know our possibilities in terms of profit and loss account, we must 
prepare extremely well each argument that will be used, because we 
know that the rational truth-value is in syntax (p. 29). Therefore, we 
will need to apply a subroutine: 
12.1. Analysing the result of every trick, of every pair of argu-
ments, always respecting the order in which they have been 
played. 
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12.2.  Being aware of our mind presuppositions in front of a condi-
tional sentence. A conditional pattern presupposes always a 
cause–effect relationship (p. 30) where, if the cause is the 
case, then the effect will also be (p. 29). 
12.3.  Taking care not to trespass directly the interlocutor’s ‘truth 
zone’; therefore, we should always talk from our ‘truth zone’. 
In case some of the used arguments trespass directly the 
comfort zone of our interlocutor, they need to be modified 
(pp. 48-50).  
12.4.  Staying safe. Our arguments must be as concealed as possi-
ble, meaning that information not strictly needed should not 
be given. The information given should not discover our 
game more than strictly necessary (pp. 49-50). 
12.5.  Creating the dialogical form for every argument. As we al-
ready know the pairs –the tricks–, we know who will act as 
proponent and who as opponent for each trick. Therefore, 
we are able to create the right dialogical form for each pair. 
In any case, it is highly recommended to prepare logical dia-
logues in both directions, to be ready just in case. At this 
point we will use intuitionistic Logic because, a negotiation be-
ing a process, negotiators remain always engaged in the chain 
of arguments; thus the best way to seek an agreement is not 
saying something now and the opposite later. This is why in-
tuitionistic Logic is more commonly used. Dialogues in a clas-
sic Logic framework are restricted to the cases in which, after 
a chain of reasoning, a negotiator thinks that switching the 
point of view could be better to reach the goal, and the other 
negotiator agrees.  
 
It is now the time to evaluate the degree of accommodation between 
the previous research and the path proposed in these pages. It is the time to 
decide whether it is worthy to carry out into practice such an attempt to 
improve the negotiation process, tackled from basic linguistic structures 
(conjunctions, disjunctions, conditionals) placed under a dialogue form as a 
cognitive system which ‘understands’ natural language and where there is a 
permanent feedback between both. Now it seems relevant to go to the An-
nex, as testing ground, remembering what we said earlier (page 2): “To pre-
serve the rigour and the aseptic nature of this research we have not applied 
any framework susceptible of being applied later (…). Thus, you will not 
find any application of the Game Theory, neither NLP nor Dialogical Seman-
tics along this analysis of Camp David Accords”. We can now confirm that, 
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out of the three, only Bridge (Game Theory) has been susceptible to be 
properly applicable to the study case. NLP and Dialogical Semantics could 
have been applied if we had had access to the complete and faithful tran-
scription of all the dialogues in Camp David (document not available to the 
public). Throughout the exhaustive study of this case, even with this limita-
tion, we are sure you will be able to make a right assessment on the perti-
nence of using NLP and Dialogical Semantics for tackling negotiations. 
Along the study of Camp David Accords you will be able to discover what 
kind (content) of arguments were used, and thus, to suppose how they were 
expounded with a high degree of certainty. The whole transcription of the 
dialogues is not available but there is a sort negotiation diary. You will find 
some references to it along this research and its bibliographic whole datum 
at the Annex Bibliography –Camp David Accords: Thirteen Days After 
Twenty-Five Years, 2003.   
 
 Once we have discovered a new opportunity to apply Logical Dia-
logues, this time to deal with Negotiations, to solve conflicts and even to 
serve peace, we would like to point out some possible research lines to con-
tinue investigating this particular approach to deal with negotiations. The 
following lines are open: 
-  A dialogical analysis for intra-negotiations (inside the team itself), 
since here we have only considered the inter-negotiations. The author 
is already thinking on methods to develop this approach, and hopes 
to start soon. 
-  A Hintikka’s GTS (Game-Theoretical Semantics) approach for inter-
negotiations and for intra-negotiations as well. 
- Computer research: algorithms applied to building dialogues in a fast 
and easy way into their dialogical form, including the ‘hacker’s’ dia-
logue. This is probably the most interesting thing to do in order to 
get ready for possible attacks.  
- Philosophical implications of tackling negotiations with logical-
linguistic protocols in a dialogical framework. 
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Preface 
 
 Our conclusion about how to establish a protocol to find out the best 
order to use arguments during a negotiation process had to be proven. We 
needed a testing ground in which they could be verified. That is why we 
chose a completed negotiation case to guarantee an objective application, 
because there is no possibility to alter the events. The case chosen to apply 
the previous research has been Camp David Accords. As we said in the Intro-
duction of Act I of the main work, the research about Camp David Accords 
already appeared in a previous work (The Bridge. A bridge toward Negotiations) 
as Chapter 5 (Martínez-Cazalla, 2011, pp. 38-68), being this research older 
than its transcription in that chapter. Here we will recover that chapter, but 
not literally. Therefore, the use of square brackets to show additions or alter-
ations to the original text does not apply here.  
 The document in this annex should help assess this research in terms 
of right or wrong; without this document the semantic truth would be un-
known. To remain faithful and preserve the rigour and the aseptic nature of 
this piece of research we do not apply here any of the frameworks that we 
analysed earlier, so you will not find any application of the Game Theory, nei-
ther NLP nor Dialogical Semantics along this analysis of Camp David Ac-
cords. 
 
Why were these the agreements reached and not others? As this is the only fact 
we really know, this is what the present negotiation analysis investigates. To 
answer this question it is necessary to analyse every piece of information, 
even the smallest ones; all of them are crucial for the negotiation analysis. 
When we can understand what happened and why, then, and only then, can 
we be sure we stand on solid territory to test our conclusion. Therefore, this 
document is a proper research work by itself. This is why this Annex con-
tains its own bibliography section, where you can find specific sources as 
well as others already referred to in the bibliography section of the main 
work; the latter are shared sources for both research approaches. 
 
This part of the work was done before the main piece of research, even 
before the first work on the subject (Martínez-Cazalla, 2011). Sometime lat-
er, when investigating about how to solve the difficulty to decide the order 
in which to use arguments during a negotiation process, we ratified this case 
                                              
 A published presentation by Martínez-Cazalla (2012) about this subject is also available. 
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was a very good testing ground for checking our results. This is why this 
document is laid out in a slightly different style, as you will realise in the bib-
liography section.
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It was on that occasion that the LORD made a covenant with Abraham, saying:  
To your descendants I give this land,  
from the Wadi of Egypt to the Great River [Euphrates] 
Genesis 15:181 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This work has been written thinking of people who love logical2 games, 
because talking about a negotiation is keeping in the scene the different 
pieces involved in the study case and finding the threads that weave them 
together, then understanding what happened and why. 
 
 An investigation which tries to analyse a negotiation must give an an-
swer to the question Why were the agreements these, and not others? For our spe-
cific case, Camp David Accords, the concrete question is Why did the Sinai come 
back to Egypt and not any other of the territories occupied during the ’67 War? This 
was the fact that made possible the signature of The Egyptian–Israeli Peace 
Treaty, six months later (Washington, March 26, 1979). Knowing and under-
standing this event is the only possibility to understand the history. Once 
history is understood, then it is possible to discuss it. When we are discuss-
ing history we are making History. The aim of analysing an international 
negotiation is to learn the lessons that History is teaching. For this purpose, 
we need to redo the puzzle of the analysed case from the only part that is 
known: the final agreement –the Accords–. 
 
In the following pages we will try to revive the negotiation held during 
thirteen days in Camp David in September 1978, between Israel and Egypt, 
with the mediation of the USA. Thus, we suggest you to forget the known 
agreements –Accords– and to start looking for the pieces involved. 
Let us start this work with the key pieces (OCEAN). First of all we will 
have to answer these questions: 
- Which was the Object of the negotiation? 
- Which was the Context of the negotiation? 
- Which were the Elements of the negotiation? 
- Was there an Asymmetrical relationship of power among the differ-
ent teams involved? 
                                              
1 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (1970). Square brackets in the consulted text. 
2 It should be noted that the word logical is taken in a wide sense along this piece of research –
Annex–, and not in the meaning it has in the context of formal Logic. 
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- Who were the Negotiators –including the mediator? 
Second, we have to relate these pieces to each other. Our game is start-
ed, we have the pieces and now we begin assembling them. We necessarily 
wonder about the threads which weave together the Object with the Con-
text with the Elements with the Asymmetrical relationship of power and 
with the Negotiators, seeking an answer the following questions: 
- Which was the structure of the negotiation? 
- Were there cultural differences among the negotiators? 
- How were the relationships among the different negotiators in-
volved? 
- Which was the strategy deployed? 
- What was the process? 
Once the different pieces and their relationships have been addressed, 
our puzzle seems finished but, is it really finished? This is the moment to 
remember the Accords forgotten in the former page and try to fit them in our 
puzzle. The tighter the pieces fit, the better the master lesson learned, which 
will be used to continue building History along future negotiations. 
  
To deal with the questions arisen before, we would normally use spe-
cific sources, that is, the official documents of Camp David Accords, and the 
manuals about it or about international negotiations; the huge amount of 
literature available –not all of it rigorous– makes it impossible to handle 
within the scope of this paper. Giving our puzzle a logical form required 
narrowing down the documents from ordinary press sources, as they are 
usually not specialized. Since the negotiations were held in the most com-
plete privacy, this work has been developed starting from the declassified 
sources, authorized sources and specialized manuals. As in every choice, 
there are advantages –working with the most accurate sources–, but also 
disadvantages –omitting the opinions of the world about what happened in 
Camp David–. What is more real, what the world thinks and believes or what the docu-
ments say? People would probably say general opinion is more real; however, 
we think that working from the direct sources is better to learn how the ne-
gotiation was handled. Another disadvantage of working from the original 
documents is that not all declassified sources are easily available, for in-
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stance, the Briefings to prepare the Camp David Accords.3 Another problem was 
to verify the conclusion to our hypothesis with experts (Why did the Sinai 
come back to Egypt and not any other of the territories occupied during the ’67 War?), 
since authorized and declassified sources explain what happened, but not 
why –or not so clearly. To discover the true reasons for the final agreement 
requires us to be logical, to look thoroughly into every piece of information 
and to verify the findings. 
 
We invite you to look in the next pages at the different pieces of the 
negotiation proposed, and to build your personal puzzle with them. Our 
puzzle and our conclusion, although well founded, are not the only possible 
truth. This work aims to be just a modest contribution to the search of key 
pieces that help analyse negotiations.  
 
Please enjoy the paper and remember that the only possible glue for 
the puzzle pieces is logic4. Good luck in this logical game! 
 
Key Pieces (OCEAN) 
In this chapter we analyse the key pieces of our puzzle. They are the 
ones proposed at the introduction of this paper: the Object, the Context, 
the Elements, the Asymmetrical power, and the Negotiators involved (in-
cluding the mediator) for this study case Camp David Accords. The order pro-
posed to follow is not an order of importance; it is only an order to put for-
ward the pieces involved, as a framework for our work: building the puzzle 
of Camp David Accords.  
Object of the negotiation 
 It has to be stated first that the object of a negotiation is not the objec-
tive/goal of the negotiation. The goal is always to find an agreement and the 
object is the matter that we want (more or less willingly) to negotiate. 
                                              
3 Vance (1978). Study Papers for the Camp David Talks –official name of this document– or 
Briefings to prepare the Camp David Accords –name given by the Carter Library to the collection 
of documents used by Carter to prepare the Camp David meeting with Israel and Egypt in 
September 1978, when this piece of research was written. These documents were declassified 
on August 13, 2003 but in the time this piece was written, they were only available for consul-
tation at the library room by individual previous request; permission to photocopy had to be 
also requested at that time. Nowadays, this document is fully available to the public, even 
online. 
4 It should be noted that the word logic is taken in a wide sense along this piece of research –
Annex–, and not in the meaning it has in the context of formal Logic. 
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The object to negotiate is the sovereignty of the territories occupied by 
Israel during the ‘67 War, because this is the main reason for the lack of 
peace in the Middle East. Peace between Israel and the Arab Countries, and 
more specifically peace between Israel and Egypt, is the true objective, be-
cause after the ‘67 War real peace never came, the conflict became perma-
nent in a higher or lower degree, and the situation in the Middle East was 
more unstable every day. The world needs and wants peace in this region, 
and the region needs it too. Eleven years after the ‘67 War the Middle East 
and the Occidental World wished to set the UN SC RES 242 and 338, each 
party according only to their own interests.  
 
Let us see now where the key points of this object are; therefore we 
will look at the essential paragraphs in those two Resolutions of the UN 
Security Council, which involve controversial points: 
 
From the UN SC RES 242 (November 22, 1967): 
 
1.  Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the estab-
lishment of a just lasting peace in the Middle East which should include 
the application of both the following principles: 
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent con-
flict [emphasis added]; 
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and 
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political inde-
pendence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure 
and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force [emphasis 
added]; 
2.  Affirms further the necessity 
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international water-
ways in the area; 
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; 
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and the political independ-
ence of every State in the area, through measures including the establish-
ment of demilitarized zones; 
 
From the UN SC RES 338 (October 22, 1973): 
 
2.  Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the imple-
mentation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts [emphasis 
added], 
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3.  Decides that, immediately and concurrently with cease-fire, negotiations 
shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establish-
ing a just and durable peace in the Middle East [emphasis added]. 
 
 Israel and Egypt sat to negotiate the sovereignty over the territories 
occupied by Israel during the ‘67 War to consolidate the peace in the Middle 
East, but the controversial point is there since the first sentences: “(...) from 
territories occupied in the recent conflict” (UN SC, 1967, RES 242, 1.(i)). 
Which are the territories occupied? Does this mean all territories occupied? or 
Will this sentence be fulfilled if the resolution is applied to just one territory?  
 
 For the moment, we can agree that the Object is negotiating the sover-
eignty of the territories occupied by Israel during the ‘67 War, without going 
into discussing what the true meaning of “territories occupied” is. 
Context of the negotiation 
 The context of the negotiation is a regional context. The region is the 
Middle East, a region of paramount importance in the world because of its 
position: capital geographic position (gravity centre between East and West), 
capital geopolitical position (directly deriving from the former), capital geo-
logical position (because of the riches in its subsoil), and capital geo-
economical position (a consequence of the geological wealth). Anything that 
happens there will be transcendent to the rest of the world. Therefore, the 
context is at the same time regional and global.  
  
 It should be kept in mind that the negotiation occurs in the context of 
the Cold War era. The support given by the USSR to the Arab States directly 
involved in this conflict has been evident since the ‘67 War, while the USA 
gave support to Israel. 
  
 The tension grew higher after the last war, Yom Kippur War (October 
1973), and the risk of a new world war increased. The conflict won a true 
international dimension. The decision of the USA to mediate in favour of an 
accord among the parties involved, specifically between the most powerful 
parties on the region (Israel and Egypt), was a strategic and diplomatic deci-
sion. On one hand, the USA made an attempt to pacify the region, being 
peace the best guarantee to assure control of the area and its economic re-
sources; on the other hand, as the USA volunteered as mediator, it appeared 
in front of the world as the saviour and not as a threat to its rival, the USSR. 
Moreover, the USA appeared in front of the parties (Israel and Egypt) as a 
potential true mediator, in spite of its interests and preferences, and also as 
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the true power in the world –in the ‘70s the USSR power was already in 
decadence. 
Elements of the negotiation 
 The elements –interests– of the negotiation are not always real, but their 
importance is that they are true inside the mind which believes in them. 
What are the elements inside the minds of the negotiators, including the 
mediator? Answering this question is almost impossible because nobody can 
be into anybody’s mind. In this sense, any answer will be a little daring. 
Nevertheless, we will try to give a possible answer, based on the background 
of knowledge that we have about the conflict being negotiated. 
 In such a way, we can think that the elements involved are: 
- To Israel: Preserving the territories occupied during the ‘67 War, and 
consolidating its presence and power in the world. The territories oc-
cupied are at the same time a physical item and a psychological item, 
with all elements that the psychological items entail (in terms of pow-
er and cultural presence). 
- To Egypt: Recovering the territories occupied during the ‘67 War, and 
so, raising its power in the Middle East, physical power, since it 
would be the only state that could win something from Israel, so 
much as recovering the control on the two banks of the Suez Canal.  
- To the USA: To them the element territories occupied is a very good pre-
text, the true element to get involved in the negotiation being their 
need to ensure peace in the region. The USA has great economic, 
strategical, and political interests there: on the one hand, to control 
the power of the USSR, and on the other hand to secure the supply 
of raw materials to cover its needs. 
Asymmetrical power among the teams  
 Who the mediator was, determined the degree of power asymmetry in 
this negotiation. 
 In the context of a bipolar world: Cold War era –USA vs. USSR, in 
which each of the parties (Israel and Egypt) was supported by one of the 
power blocks (USA or USSR), the power balance fell toward one side from 
the beginning, even if it was only a psychological effect, due to the fact that 
the USA was the third negotiating party (the mediator). Moreover, playing at 
home is always an advantage, and this negotiation took place in the USA. 
So, it could be said that Israel starts off as a favourite, since the mediator 
happens to be Israel’s own protector. However, the USA mediation will aim 
to protect first the USA own interests in the Middle East. It is the USA 
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which had de facto the power balance in its hands. No wonder they volun-
teered as mediators, so much for the need to guarantee their interests as for 
the ability to show-off muscle –we are at the end of the ‘70s, still in the Cold 
War era period, and the power of the USSR starts showing the large internal 
fissures that took the USSR to crumbling down a decade later (1989). 
Negotiators’ profile 
 Negotiators are a key piece; they are the subjects of negotiation. There-
fore, they hold the negotiation together. Until now, we have looked at the 
invariable keys, which are independent of the negotiator dealing with them. 
However, their value changes according to the subject who negotiates with 
them, thus they might increase or diminish their worth. Negotiators are the 
active part in negotiation, and they will provide gains or losses in the course 
of negotiation. 
 
 Let us review the main features of the profile of each one of the nego-
tiators, in order to understand how our pieces hold together. Those features 
can be found in the biographical data that we know of each one of the sub-
jects: 
- Menachem Begin for Israel: Polish origin (Brest, August 16, 1913). At-
tached to the Zionist movement in Poland since age 12 years. He ob-
tained a Law Degree in 1935 at the Warsaw University. Outstanding 
student because of his rhetoric and oratory abilities. After the Nazis 
invasion of Poland he was captured by the Soviets in his flee and was 
deported to a labour camp in Siberia. After liberation, having lost his 
family during Holocaust, he moved to Palestine while serving in the 
British army as an interpreter. He took advantage of this position to 
actively collaborate in overthrowing British power from Palestine and 
in the illegal immigration of Jews. After proclamation of the State of 
Israel he remained very active in the Likud bloc (Jewish right party) 
reaching leadership in 1977. He was the first Israeli Prime Minister to 
name the Jordan River territories, including the West Bank, using 
their biblical names (Judea and Samaria). He was also the first Israeli 
Prime Minister to set foot on Egypt (Ismailia, December 25, 1977), in 
correspondence to the visit of Sadat, President of Egypt, to Jerusalem 
one month earlier –November 1977. 
From the former data, we can infer that Begin’s personality is of the 
type “Extraversion—being sociable, assertive, talkative” (Barrick & Mount, 
1991. Quoted by Lewicki, Barry, & Saunders, 2004, p. 429). 
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- Anwar al-Sadat for Egypt: Born in Egypt (December 25, 1918), he went 
to a British military school in Egypt; his aim, however, was to over-
throw British power from his homeland. After graduating, he went in 
search of Nasser, and together they started gathering a revolutionary 
group of military officials. After being in prison for revolutionary ac-
tivities and for actively collaborating in King Farouk’s deposition –a 
puppet of the British power–, he finally reached power in the neigh-
bourhood of Nasser –eventually becoming his confidence man. He 
was vice president since 1969 until Nasser’s death in 1970; Sadat took 
then office as President of Egypt. After their defeat in the Yom Kippur 
War in 1973 and the urgent state of necessity of the country, Sadat 
reoriented his Foreign Policy. Addressing the force toward the Arab 
League and the fight against the State of Israel seemed unwise under 
the circumstances: their backing power, the USSR was showing in-
creasing signs of decadence; Egypt was going through a period of ne-
cessity after the two defeats in front of Israel. This situation required 
accepting the USA help and starting to look toward the West in a 
more open manner, fighting out suspicion. Sadat, invited by the Israe-
li Prime Minister Begin, visited Jerusalem in November 1977 with the 
aim of starting a peace process in the Middle East. 
 From the former data we can infer that Sadat’s personality is of the 
type “Conscientiousness—being responsible, organized, achievement ori-
ented” (Barrick & Mount, 1991. Quoted by Lewicki et al., 2004, p. 429). 
- Jimmy Carter for the USA (mediator): Born and raised in the State of 
Georgia (October 1, 1924), in the South East of the USA. The son of 
farmers, and active Christian Baptist throughout his life. He holds a 
degree in Science and was a member of the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence, ascribed to submarine missions. He started his political career 
in the late ‘50s. He became President of the USA for the Democrat 
party on January 20, 1977. Among the priorities for his term was the 
creation of the Department of Energy –August 4, 1977. He signed a 
new anti-ballistic accord with the USSR (SALT II. Vienna 1979). He 
also established diplomatic relations between the USA and the Popu-
lar Republic of China.  
From the former data we can infer that Carter’s personality is of the 
type “Agreeableness—being flexible, cooperative, trusting” (Barrick & 
Mount, 1991. Quoted by Lewicki et al., 2004, p. 429).  
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 Once the key pieces have been analysed, and once we know the per-
sonalities of the negotiators in the play, we may start thinking that the nego-
tiation took place within the tension between competing and collaborating, with 
a clear trend toward competing. Carter’s tough task throughout the negotia-
tions was to conduct such tension toward a result of compromise. In fact, 
Carter was aware of the strong need for compromise in the Briefings to prepare 
the Camp David Accords: 
 
II. How to Mediate Between the two Leaders [underlined in the original 
text] 
-- Both master manipulators, utilizing basically two different personality 
styles in order to achieve power and control. Begin concentrates on tactics 
and details, whereas Sadat focuses on the grand strategy, often employing 
broad dramatic gestures. In each case, this allows them to avoid making 
hard decisions. The intermediary trying to bring Sadat the conceptualist 
and Begin the Talmudic scholar together will have to move each man away 
from his preferred political (and psychological) style. 
-- In dealing with Begin, avoid entering into word definitions. Allow him 
to make his basic point without interference and then point him to the in-
tended objective. Begin’s concentration on detail is basically an evasive, 
controlling technique which can be overcome by summarizing succinctly 
his point of view and then redirecting him back to the mainstream of the 
discussions. 
In contrast, Sadat will need more guidance, direction, and limit-setting. 
Left alone, he may get involved in ambiguities and generalities. The Presi-
dent can take advantage of this style by summarizing Sadat’s basic intent in 
such a way that it appears that there are greater points of agreement with 
Begin than would otherwise be the case. (Vance, 1978 –declassified on 
August 13, 2003–, TAB 4 –Considerations for Conducting the Summit 
Meetings–, p. 3) 
 
 Now we have the puzzle pieces, we can foresee the degree of assertive-
ness↔competitivineness in which the relationships among the pieces will pro-
ceed. This is the time to go one step forward: toward a more thorough anal-
ysis of the relationships among those pieces. 
 
The Threads that weave together the Key Pieces 
 The pieces of this negotiation, impersonated mainly by the two charac-
ters, Begin and Sadat, need to reach BATNA (Best Alternative To a Nego-
tiated Agreement) in order to assemble seamless; however, in sight of the 
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two personalities, the initial point was bargaining situation. Changing it into a 
win-win situation would require a long development. Let us now analyse the 
different aspects that compose the path to BATNA. 
 As happened with the order of introduction of the key pieces, the as-
pects of the negotiation introduced hereafter will not be presented in order 
of importance, because each one of them is relevant for the assembling of 
our puzzle.  
Structure of the negotiation 
 Analysing the structure of a negotiation gives us, as Zartman (1991) 
puts it, “a skeleton key” (p. 65) in order to understand how the different 
pieces moved and reached their final relation; we could say that the structure 
is the scaffold where we can walk, while always keeping in mind the flexibil-
ity limits of such a structure.  
 For our case, we can imagine a triangular scaffold, each one of the ac-
tors –Negotiators– in a vertex; Begin and Sadat are in the base vertices, 
whereas Carter is in the apex. This triangle is circumscribed by the circle of 
Context. The triangle sides represent the Elements –interests– for which the 
negotiation takes place. The angular tension is given by the degree of power 
Asymmetry; in this case there is some tilt in favour of Israel and the USA, as 
we have seen before, creating two angles <60º, whereas Egypt angle is >60º. 
The area inscribed in the triangle represents the Object of negotiation. 
 We have already described our scaffold –skeleton. For the moment, 
this is an inert shape, it is what is given. How to go from static to dynamic, 
from the bargaining attitude to a win-win attitude, will be the task of the medi-
ator. Carter had to find the ‘integral function’ of the vectors that are present 
in the triangle, concentrate them in the triangle incenter, and thus achieve 
the Objective of the negotiation. 
 We are in front of a circumscribed triangle shape that will be forced in 
an attempt of changing it into a point circumscribed by a context that will 
have been modified by the direct action of the integration of the triangle in 
the point. The change from one scaffold shape to the other will be deter-
mined by these four questions: the underlying cultures, the relationships 
among the actors, the unfolded strategy, and the process. The strategy will 
be determined by the relationships among the actors, and it will undoubted-
ly be influenced by the deepest cultural roots of each of them (human be-
ings make decisions based on their beliefs –not only religious). 
  
 Now it is time we inquire about the cultural background of each nego-
tiator, so to understand later their mutual relationships, and further the 
strategy that each of them will display during the process. Finally, the analy-
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sis of the process will provide us a global vision of what happened and why. 
We will be able to obtain the ‘formula’ (the ‘integral function’ defining the 
convergence area –incenter–), although with incomplete precision (because 
that is how integrals are, where the differential coefficient has to be ideally 
as close as possible to 0); anyway, our ‘function’ is nothing but a sort of 
mathematical representation of BATNA.  
The matter of cultural differences 
The negotiators come from different cultures: Begin from Jewish, Sa-
dat from Muslim and Carter from Christian culture. However, the three of 
them share something: they are compromised with the religion of their cul-
ture. This is their common point; therefore, here lays the basis of the ‘func-
tion’ we want to start building. 
 We should be aware that the load of the cultural values is stronger in 
Begin and Sadat than in Carter, because in the Jewish and Muslim cultures 
there is only a narrow separation between religious and political power. The 
fact that Carter shares with the others the worth of religion makes him a 
suitable mediator, since he knows the keys with which religion can re-ligate 
people. To find a meeting point among these apparently dissimilar cultures 
was Carter’s heavy task:  
 
At points of resistance, the President may remind them that they already 
share objectives in common. The Summit meetings are a means of discov-
ering those points of similarity. The objective is to minimize their real dif-
ferences and maximize their apparent similarities [underlined in the origi-
nal text]. (Vance, 1978 –declassified on August 13, 2003–, TAB 4 –
Considerations for Conducting the Summit Meetings–, p. 1) 
 
 The point that would minimize their real differences and maximize their appar-
ent similarities is to be found in their deepest, in the main root of their beliefs. 
Only by knowing this point was it possible to design an adequate strategy 
for this case, in which the object was the lands and the boundaries between 
states with different cultures:  
 
(...) This is an especially challenging (negotiation) because cross-cultural 
and international negotiations add a level of complexity significantly great-
er than within-culture negotiations. 
(...) This complexity is a source of frustration for many cross-cultural ne-
gotiators, who would like clearer practical guidance when negotiating 
across borders. (Lewicki et al., 2004, p. 443) 
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Zartman (1993) states that:  
 
 Culture is indeed relevant to the understanding of the negotiation process 
–every bit as relevant as breakfast and to much the same extent. Like the 
particular type of breakfast the negotiators ate, culture is cited primarily for 
its negative effects. Yet even the best understanding of any such effect is 
tautological, its measure vague, and its role in the process, basically epi-
phenomenal. (p. 17) 
 
Moreover, the New Encyclopædia Britannica defines culture as:  
 
(…) the integrate pattern of human knowledge, belief and behaviour. Cul-
ture thus defined consists of language, ideas, beliefs, customs, taboos, 
codes, institutions, tools, techniques, works of art, rituals, ceremonies and 
other related components; and the development of culture depends upon 
man’s capacity to learn and to transmit knowledge to succeeding genera-
tions. (1990, Vol. 3, p. 784. Quoted by Lang, 1993, p. 38) 
 
 In the present case, culture (religion, in a more generic sense) is what 
provides a “(...) bridge between the two sides—” (Salacuse, 1993, p. 204). 
Thus, this will be our starting point –the experience of the religious fact–; it 
will be represented by the symbol of the ‘integral function’ and it will be 
specifically characterising our ‘function’.  
 
 Now it is time to consider the relationships of the actors among them-
selves and with their acts –the strategy deployed which creates a process. 
We will look at this as ‘properties’ which are characterising the negotiators’ 
relationships and their actions (‘reflexive’, ‘symmetric’ and ‘transitive’), see-
ing them as items constituting one ensemble. 
Relationships among the negotiators 
 Thinking about this brings up directly the question of the behaviour 
that the negotiators will show and their interactions. The question is really 
about the ‘reflexive property’, because the isolation imposed on the negotia-
tors has them in a closed system in which their only relationship is with 
themselves. Their personalities, strongly characterised by their beliefs in a 
wide sense, define their relationships. 
 Thus, we can expect a relationship revolving around itself, marked by 
the reiterative rhythm of religious fundamentalism of both Begin and Sadat. 
Their relationship will have a marked authoritarian character, accompanied 
by the peal of unmatched notes. Carter, understanding this fundamentalism, 
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‘will have to ring the bell’, aiming at cracking the dispute in order to open a 
gate to integrative dialogue, breaking the distributive rhythm that the others 
intend to set. With this aim in mind Carter sets the pace of the meetings 
reaffirming whatever links the negotiators and eluding or postponing what-
ever divides them:  
 
The pivotal issue in the talks will be Israel’s need to know whether they 
can get an agreement on the Sinai and what price they must pay for it in 
concessions on the West Bank. You will want to clarify with Sadat in your 
opening session that the prospect of an agreement there will be the major 
incentive for Israel. The more precise he can be about a final, if phased, 
agreement there the more he can seek in the West Bank/Gaza in return. 
(Vance, 1978 –declassified on August 13, 2003–, TAB 1 –An Overview of 
the Camp David Talks–, p. 2) 
The strategy 
 Once we know the nature (culture/religion) that determines the ‘reflex-
ive’ relationship, we want to know how else this specific nature could ex-
press beyond this sterile relationship. That is, we want to know about the 
strategies on which the actors based their actions. Every cause inevitably 
produces an effect. Thus, to analyse the strategy developed in a negotiation 
means to analyse the ‘symmetric property’ (the actors’ relationships and 
their influence on their actions). 
 The strategy is just the negotiators’ estimation about how they will pro-
ceed. It is determined by the personality of each of them and by the goals 
they wish to reach as result of the negotiation process. So, the strategy will 
be more or less effective depending on the self-control the negotiators can 
exert when expressing their personality, and on the definition of their goals:  
 
Effective goals must be concrete, specific, and measurable. The less con-
crete and measurable our goals are, the harder it is to (a) communicate to 
the other party what we want, (b) understand what the other party wants, 
and (c) determine whether an offer on the table satisfies our goals. 
(Lewicki et al., 2004, p. 109)  
 
The strategy is the frame in which the negotiation process will develop. The 
choice of certain tactics to implement the planned strategy will also have an 
effect in the outcome of the negotiation:  
 
Although the line between strategy and tactics may seem fuzzy, one major 
difference is that of scale, or immediacy (Quinn, 1991). Tactics are short-
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term, adaptive moves designed to enact or pursue broad (or higher-level) 
strategies, which in turn provide stability, continuity, and direction for tac-
tical behaviours. (Lewicki et al., 2004, pp. 110-111) 
 
 In our case we can infer that, in the beginning, cause–effect relation-
ship would have been marked by competition. Both Begin and Sadat wanted 
peace in the Middle East, but their disposition to collaboration was weak. 
Their strategy was to try to get as much as possible from their opponent 
while yielding nothing or as little as possible of their own. Carter’s strategy 
was to gently bring them to a position closer to integration–collaboration. He 
worked from what apparently was an accommodation plane, prioritising a good 
relational outcome over good substantive outcomes for securing the USA 
interests. With this strategy, he looked for points of deep connection, in 
order to build on them an agreement over the differences: “(...) The objec-
tive is to minimize their real differences and maximize their apparent simi-
larities [underlined in the original text]” (Vance, 1978 –declassified August 
13, 2003–, TAB 4 –Considerations for Conducting the Summit Meetings–, 
p. 1). 
 The mediator’s strategy was necessary to gradually turn the symmetrical 
cause–effect relationship between Begin and Sadat into a less destructive, 
more constructive one. For a constructive relationship “(...) agreement is 
necessary on several issues: the price, the closing date of (...), renovations 
to—” (Lewicki et al., 2004, p. 38). Finally, reaching BATNA was, if not an 
absolute collaboration at least within a bargaining mix. 
The process 
 The negotiation process can be summarized as the development of the 
‘transitive property’, since the implementation of the strategy creates not only 
a ‘symmetric’ relationship, determined by the cause–effect relationship, but 
also a collateral effect, unaccounted for, produced by the tactical acts –a sort 
of third party. 
 Therefore, the process leading to accomplish some type of agreement, 
of a greater or lesser extent in accordance with the goals, depends largely on 
the process development and its effects on the participating actors.  
 Taking all that into account, together with the negotiation timing, we 
can now analyse each one of its phases5:  
- Phase 1: Preparation. (February 14, 1977 to September 5, 1978). On 
February 14, Carter took the initiative of writing letters to Sadat and 
                                              
5 The phases are taken from Lewicki et al., 2004, p. 117, Figure 4.3. 
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Rabin (Israeli Prime Minister at that time), at the request of his State 
Secretary –Cyrus Vance– at his return from a mission in the Middle 
East, urging them to start peace negotiations for the area: 
From the letter from President Jimmy Carter to President Anwar al-
Sadat of Egypt, written during the first month of President Carter 
administration: 
 
(...) I look forward to meeting whit you personally at the earliest 
opportunity. I have asked Secretary Vance to discuss when and how 
our first meeting might be arranged. In view of the importance of 
Egypt in our common pursuit of peace (...). The growing friendship 
and cooperation between Egypt and the United States have already 
brought us some steps along the path to peace. (Camp David Ac-
cords: Twenty-Five Documents After Twenty-Five Years, 2003. 
Document 1, 1977, pp. 1-2 –declassified on October 3, 1997–) 
 
From the letter from President Jimmy Carter to President Yitzhak 
Rabin of Israel, written during the first month of President Carter 
administration: 
 
I am confident that USA–Israeli relations will continue on the cor-
dial and sound basis that has characterized the close ties between 
our countries and peoples for three decades. I look forward to 
working closely whit you in our common search for a lasting peace 
settlement in the Middle East. (Camp David Accords: Twenty-Five 
Documents After Twenty-Five Years, 2003. Document 2, 1977,    
p. 1 –declassified on December 11, 1998–) 
 
 From that day (February 14) to the start of the negotiations in Camp 
David (September 6, 1978) the countries involved prepared the negotiation 
meticulously, since the interests at stake were of paramount importance to 
each one of them, as we have already seen. 
- Phase 2: Relationship building. The relationships among the negotiators 
were modelled during the Preparation Phase. We should remark here 
that the position of the USA was that of an impartial mediator. For 
this, Carter had a private meeting with each of the other two negotia-
tors in the morning of September 6, with the aim to create an atmos-
phere of confidence during the negotiations:  
 
(...) seeking to build a common recognition of the unique oppor-
tunity these talks offer, the responsibility to history the three of 
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them share, and the need to grasp the nettle now [underlined in the 
original text]. He could emphasize that the negotiations have 
reached a stage where only heads of government can break the im-
passe, and therefore each side must try understand the other’s polit-
ical problems. (...)  Since each side will have as an objective captur-
ing the USA, the President with sympathy for each side’s interests 
will have to establish the independence of the USA position [emphasis add-
ed]. Each will want a sense of special relationship with us; we will 
want to be close to each without being in either’s pocket. (Vance, 
1978 –declassified on August 13, 2003–, TAB 2 –A Scenario for 
Camp David–, pp. 2-3) 
 
- Phase 3: Information gathering. This is the time when all the negotiators 
meet to explain to each other what has brought them to this gather-
ing and what do they expect to get from it. This meeting took place 
in the afternoon of September 6:  
 
Later in the day, the three men used the patio outside Aspen for 
further discussions. They talked about three issues: 1) the Sinai Pen-
insula between Egypt and Israel, 2) the ownership of the West Bank 
and Gaza areas bordering Israel, and 3) the role that Palestinian 
people would have in governing themselves. (Camp David Accords: 
Thirteen Days After Twenty-Five Years, 2003, September 6, 1978 –
gathered for the 25th anniversary of the Camp David Accords) 
 
- Phase 4: Information using. Here the negotiators will express themselves 
with regard to the way in which an agreement will be possible on the 
three points expounded in the former phase. Along this phase the 
constraints/preferences for an eventual agreement will become ap-
parent. This was the hardest part of the negotiation, because Sadat 
and Begin were directly affected by the subjects to be discussed: sov-
ereignty, security, and economy (the three pillars of foreign policy), 
with the aggravating circumstance of having to talk about Jerusalem, 
Holy City for Jews and Muslims, and a necessary subject when dis-
cussing the territories occupied during the ‘67 War. This phase started 
in the morning of Thursday September 7 and was finished by Carter 
in the night of Tuesday September 12 when, in view of the sterility of 
endless discussions, he decided to assertively intervene by choosing 
the less problematic issue, the Sinai, to set a framework for an agree-
ment: ““I decided to work that afternoon on the terms for an Egyp-
tian–Israeli treaty, and spread the Sinai maps out on the dining table 
to begin this task, writing the proposed agreement on a yellow scratch 
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pad.” —Jimmy Carter from Keeping Faith” (Camp David Accords: 
Thirteen Days After Twenty-Five Years, 2003, September 12, 1978 –
gathered for the 25th anniversary of the Camp David Accords). 
- Phase 5: Bidding. This was the most difficult time of the negotiation. 
The positions of Sadat and Begin seemed irreconcilable and Carter 
feared not to reach an agreement. But peace in the Middle East was 
crucial for the USA interests and he decided to ‘impose’ peace in the 
region: 
 
Determined to reach agreement on a framework for peace, Carter 
and Vance spent eleven hours with Aharon Barak from Israel and 
Osama el-Baz from Egypt to work out the detailed language of the 
framework proposal. As they hammered out the language of each 
phrase, both Barak and el-Baz demonstrated their astute legal 
minds and their excellent knowledge of English. When differences 
in language stopped progress, President Carter suggested that 
"West Bank" be used in the English and Arabic texts, while "Judea 
and Samaria" be used in the Hebrew version; "Palestinians" in the 
English and Arabic, yet "Palestinian Arabs" in the Hebrew. He 
would explain the change in a letter to Begin. The letter would be 
attached to any formal agreement they would reach. The letter ex-
change idea became a critical factor in making progress toward 
agreement. (Camp David Accords: Thirteen Days After Twenty-
Five Years, 2003, September 13, 1978 –gathered for the 25th anni-
versary of the Camp David Accords) 
 
In spite of Carter’s efforts, the negotiation is in a deadlock of bargain-
ing–bargaining:  
 
“We can go no further.” –Carter  
“I am leaving.” –Sadat 
President Sadat could not agree to leave Israeli settlements and air-
fields in the Sinai Peninsula, and Prime Minister Begin could not 
agree to remove these settlements. Without agreement on these is-
sues, there did not appear to be any way to continue. Carter had al-
ready told the delegations that Sunday, September 17, would be the 
last day of the meetings. He had requested that all the delegations 
work on a joint statement about the meetings, emphasizing the pos-
itive accomplishments. (Camp David Accords: Thirteen Days After 
Twenty-Five Years, 2003, September 15, 1978 –gathered for the 
25th anniversary of the Camp David Accords) 
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In this critical situation, with only 48 hours left, Carter played his only 
winning trick –reminding Sadat of the importance of collaborating with 
Israel and changing his own attitude in order to reach a peace agree-
ment, since future Egypt–USA relationships depend on this:  
 
“I explained to [Sadat] the extremely serious consequences... that 
his action would harm the relationship between Egypt and the 
United States, he would be violating his personal promise to me... 
[and] damage one of my most precious possessions –his friendship 
and our mutual trust." —Jimmy Carter from Keeping Faith [additions 
included in the original text]. (Camp David Accords: Thirteen Days 
After Twenty-Five Years, 2003, September 15, 1978 –gathered for 
the 25th anniversary of the Camp David Accords) 
 
Next morning he addressed Begin’s iron position:  
 
“Ultimatum, Excessive Demands, Suicide” –Begin 
Even though the progress of the talks was faltering, Carter's deter-
mination to reach agreement remained strong. In another negotiat-
ing session with Begin, Barak, and Dayan, Carter and Vance made a 
case for peace, going through the Sinai framework and the Frame-
work for Peace line by line. (Camp David Accords: Thirteen Days 
After Twenty-Five Year, 2003, September 16, 1978 –gathered for 
the 25th anniversary of the Camp David Accords) 
 
- Phase 6: Closing the deal. Carter’s words to Sadat and Begin had the 
expected effect: on that same day –September 16– a safe path was 
tended toward the peace agreement:  
 
Carter explained to Begin that Sadat would not continue negotia-
tions toward a peace treaty until the Israeli settlements in the Sinai 
region were removed. After a storm of protest, Begin finally agreed 
to submit the question of settlements to the Israeli Knesset for a 
decision—If any agreement is reached on all other Sinai issues, will all the 
settlers be withdrawn? [emphasis in the original text] He even promised 
to allow each Knesset and Cabinet member to vote individually, 
without the requirements of political party loyalty. This was ac-
ceptable to Sadat! 
Carter explained to Sadat that Begin would not allow the phrase 
"inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war" to be part of the 
Framework for Peace. [1967 U.N. Resolution 242, which contains 
this phrase, is to be found in the annex of the Framework. Begin 
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claimed that it did not apply to Israel because the 1967 War was a 
defensive war for his country] [square brackets in the original text]. 
Begin insisted that only permanent residents of the West Bank and 
Gaza areas, not all Palestinians, participate in future peace negotia-
tions. Sadat agreed to write one letter defining Egypt's role in these 
negotiations and one letter stating his position on an undivided Je-
rusalem. This was acceptable to Begin!  
All through the meetings, Carter continued to remind Sadat and 
Begin how much each had to gain in making peace. (Camp David 
Accords: Thirteen Days After Twenty-Five Years, 2003, September 
16, 1978 –gathered for the 25th anniversary of the Camp David Ac-
cords) 
 
- Phase 7: Implementing the agreement: In the end, there was a ‘formula’, 
the ‘integral’ had been defined, a point of convergence had been 
reached: the incenter of our triangle. “… a significant achievement in 
the cause of peace…”, in the Carter’s words(Camp David Accords: 
Thirteen Days After Twenty-Five Years, 2003, September 17, 1978 –
gathered for the 25th anniversary of the Camp David Accords, Sep-
tember). This was the moment to define how, when and where would 
the agreement be implemented. This was the moment to draw the 
circumference to circumscribe the encounter point –incenter. On 
Sunday September 17, 1978, two accords were reached: a Framework 
for Peace in the Middle East and a Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace 
Treaty between Egypt and Israel. Both were signed by the three leaders –
Anwar al-Sadat, Menachem Begin and Jimmy Carter– on the same 
day, at the official signing ceremony of the Camp David Accords in 
Washington.  
 
 
 At this point of our analysis, the pieces of the puzzle are already in 
place. Sadat and Begin were able to move from a distributive position to an 
integrative one, thus reaching an agreement that met the goals. But there is 
still one more step to go in our analysis process because, as every integral, 
this one has also a differential coefficient; What is the ‘coefficient’ for this ‘inte-
gral’? This is the question we will address next. 
 
The Key Piece: The Agreement. Level of Adjustment 
 The ‘differential coefficient’ will allow us understanding the agreement 
of the negotiation. Our question now should be what has been the ‘differen-
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tial coefficient’ here, and why this ‘coefficient’ –and only this one– has made 
it possible to reach the goal: an accord for peace in the Middle East. Ulti-
mately, the ‘differential’ is the crux of the matter, since it is what gives us the 
key to give a logical answer to the question posed in the introduction: Why 
were the agreements these, and not others? Then, let us analyse the final docu-
ments of Camp David Accords: 
 
From the Camp David Accords: The Framework for Peace in the Middle 
East (September 17, 1978): 
 
Preamble  
The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following: 
 The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neigh-
bors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts [empha-
sis added]. 
 After four wars during 30 years, despite intensive human efforts, the 
Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of 
three great religions, does not enjoy the blessings of peace. The people 
of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural 
resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so 
that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation 
among nations. 
 The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the 
reception accorded to him by the parliament, government and people 
of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, 
the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm recep-
tion of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created 
an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this 
generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war. 
 The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other ac-
cepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted 
standards for the conduct of relations among all states. 
 To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the 
United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any 
neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it are necessary 
for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of 
Resolutions 242 and 338. 
 Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independ-
ence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and 
recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force [emphasis added]. Pro-
gress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of 
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reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting 
economic development, in maintaining stability and in assuring securi-
ty. 
 Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation be-
tween nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the 
terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, 
agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, lim-
ited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of interna-
tional forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring and other ar-
rangements that they agree are useful. 
 
 As we see here, the compromise to abide by UN SC RES 242 (1967) 
and UN SC RES 338 (1973) is to be reached only after previous settlement 
with each of the concerned States; a negotiation with every one of them was 
necessary. However, after this first document was issued, only one more doc-
ument, focusing on Egypt, could be issued, since Egypt was the only repre-
sented party at the negotiations. That is how the second Camp David doc-
ument came: Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Isra-
el. Let us find out what this document has to say about our initial question 
Why were the agreements these, and not others? 
 
From the Camp David Accords: Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace 
Treaty between Egypt and Israel (September 17, 1978): 
 
It is agreed that:  
 The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a 
 location or locations to be mutually agreed. 
 All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolu-
tion of the dispute between Israel and Egypt. 
 Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be im-
plemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed. 
 The following matters are agreed between the parties: 
1. the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border 
between Egypt and mandated Palestine [emphasis added]; 
2. the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai [emphasis added]; 
3. the use of airfields left by the Israelis near al-Arish, Rafah, Ras en-
Naqb, and Sharm el-Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possi-
ble commercial use only by all nations; 
4. the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez 
and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 
1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are 
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international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and 
nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight; 
5. the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat 
with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and 
6. the stationing of military forces listed below. 
 
 Now it is possible to understand why the presence of Egypt was neces-
sary but not sufficient to create and reach a working agreement in favour of 
achieving peace. Where is the key for sufficiency? This key lays precisely in men-
tioning which were the territories belonging to Egypt before the’67 War: the 
Sinai and Gaza. It is now when we are ready to ask the big question: Why did 
the Sinai come back to Egypt and not any other of the territories occupied during the ’67 
War? The answer is just a few lines above: “1. the full exercise of Egyptian 
sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and 
mandated Palestine” (Camp David Accords: Framework for the Conclusion 
of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, September 17, 1978). At this 
point, it seems that everything is solved and the puzzle has been perfectly 
assembled; but incisive minds may have still another question: Why does 
Egypt acknowledge the limits to its sovereignty at the border between itself and the Pales-
tinian territories? This is the precise meaning of Egypt acceding to recover the 
Sinai but not Gaza. The answer is to be found in al Quran, in the Surah which 
Begin mentioned to Sadat when he learned of his wish to visit Jerusalem 
(November 11, 1977): 
 
Your President said, two days ago, that he will be ready to come to Jerusa-
lem, to our Parliament - the Knesset - in order to prevent one Egyptian 
soldier from being wounded. It is a good statement. I have already wel-
comed it, and it will be pleasure to welcome and receive your President 
with the traditional hospitality you and we have inherited from our com-
mon father, Abraham. And I, for my part, will, of course, be ready to 
come to your capital, Cairo, for the same purpose: No more wars - peace - a 
real peace, and for ever. It is in the Holy Koran, in Surah 5, that our right to this 
Land was stated and sanctified. May I read to you this eternal Surah [emphasis 
added]: 
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“Recall when Moses said to his people: Oh my people, remember the goodness of Allah 
toward you when He appointed prophets amongst you.... Oh my people, enter the Holy 
Land which Allah hath written down as yours ... [emphasis added]”6 
It is in this spirit of our common belief in God, in Divine Providence, in 
right and in justice, in all great human values which were handed down to 
you by the Prophet Mohammed and by our Prophets –Moses, Yeshayahu, 
Yermiyahu, Yehezkiel- it is in this human spirit that I say to you with all 
my heart: Shalom. It means Sulh. (Camp David Accords: Twenty-Five 
Documents After Twenty-Five Years, 2003. Document 5, 1977, p. 2) 
 
 Now, we ought to round-up the former question, in an almost rhetori-
cal manner: Why did Begin remain this particular Surah to Sadat? What was the pre-
existing foundation that validates his words? The answers is to be found in the 
Holy Torah: “In that day the LORD made a covenant with Abram, saying: 'Unto thy 
seed have I given this land, from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river Euphra-
tes [emphasis added]” (Genesis. 15:18).7 Given that, the only one territory oc-
cupied by Israel during the ’67 War beyond the biblical bounders was the 
Sinai, so it was the only one that could come back in strict observance of Su-
rah 5:22-28 and Genesis 15:18.8 
 
                                              
6 For wider information, here is the transcription of the complete text from al Quran that 
Begin quoted. Due to its key role in the perception of our case, we have preferred to take the 
text in Spanish, an accurate translation from the original text, rather than risking a free trans-
lation to English or taking an unwarranted on line English version of the original Arabic. 
Surah 5, 22-28: “22. Cuando Moisés dijo a los israelitas: acordaos de los beneficios que habéis 
recibido de Dios; ha suscitado profetas en vuestro seno, os ha dado reyes, os ha concedido 
favores que no ha concedido jamás a nación ninguna. 23. Entra, ¡oh pueblo mío!, en la tierra 
santa que Dios te ha destinado; no volváis atrás por temor a que os encaminéis a vuestra 
perdición. 24. Este país, respondieron los israelitas, está habitado por hombres poderosos. 
Mientras lo ocupen, nosotros no entraremos en él. Si salen, nosotros tomaremos posesión de 
él. 25. Presentaos a la puerta de la villa, dijeron los hombres que temían al Señor y que esta-
ban favorecidos por sus gracias: no bien hayáis entrado, seréis vencedores. Poned vuestra 
confianza en Dios, si sois fieles. 26. ¡Oh Moisés!, dijo el pueblo, no entraremos mientras no 
haya salido el pueblo que la habita. Ve con tu Dios y combatid ambos. Nosotros permanece-
remos aquí. 27. Señor, exclamó Moisés, solo tengo poder sobre mí y sobre mi hermano; pro-
nuncia sobre nosotros y este pueblo de impíos. 28. Entonces el Señor dijo: Esta tierra les 
estará prohibida durante cuarenta años. Andarán errantes por el desierto, y tú cesa de ator-
mentarte a causa de este pueblo de impíos” (Al-Kharat, 2007). 
7 The Jewish Publication Society of America (1917). 
8 Argument on the importance of the Biblical allotment of land to this negotiation has been 
verified in a personal communication –private meeting– with a high representative of the 
Jewish religious community in Belgium who preferred to remain anonymous, December 13, 
2010. 
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 As it has been shown, the level of adjustment –the ‘differential’ in our 
‘integral’– has been reduced to an explanation/quantification as a one-
variable function, culture, and specifically religion, the deepest and most radical 
                                              
9 Retrieved from http://www.bible.ca/archeology/bible-archeology-exodus-kadesh-barnea-
southern-border-judah-territory-river-of-egypt-wadi-el-arish-tharu-rhinocolu.htm, checked on 
October 11, 2019. 
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component of culture. So is it that, in the beginning of the XXI century, religion still 
has something to teach us? The answer may not be to believe in God, its object, 
but to believe in religion in itself, its subject, for there are still today human 
beings and peoples that live in strict observance of religious laws. 
 
CONCLUSION: Logic in the Past, a Lesson for the Future 
Once our case, Camp David Accords, has been fully analysed, only one 
question remains: Is the effort of this minute analysis a contribution, or is it just an 
intellectual divertimento? To answer this question we have to go back to the 
reflection on history that was done in the introduction, where the argument 
was that the only possibility to go on building History is through a profound 
understanding of the reasons leading to a certain agreement, and not to a 
different one, in the course of an international negotiation. After all, History 
is just the history of the disagreements and agreements attained by mankind 
throughout the ages. 
 Thus, the humble contribution of this investigation is to highlight the 
role of culture from the angle of each negotiator’s beliefs, not only religious, 
but of the type “I believe X, and not Y”. Culture, the natural channel to re-
veal and to transmit beliefs, shapes us in an unyielding manner. Let us look 
again at the definition of culture in the New Encyclopædia Britannica (1990):  
 
Culture, the integrate pattern of human knowledge, belief and behaviour [emphasis 
added]. Culture thus defined consists of language, ideas, beliefs, customs, 
taboos, codes, institutions, tools, techniques, works of art, rituals, ceremo-
nies and other related components; and the development of culture depends upon 
man’s capacity to learn and to transmit knowledge to succeeding generations [emphasis 
added]. (Vol. 3, p. 784. Quoted by Lang, 1993, p. 38) 
 
We can now say that the culture (a part of which are the beliefs of the actors 
present in an international negotiation) is the cornerstone to prepare a nego-
tiation and resolve it reaching a possible and plausible agreement. This is to 
recognize that negotiation is a science in itself, as it requires to accurately 
study all the pieces involved, but it is also an art. Negotiations demand a 
savoir faire that is not related to deduction from tangible knowledge, but to 
abduction from inductive knowledge including science and art. As Lewicki 
et al. (2004) say: 
 
The notion that negotiation is both art and science is especially valid at the cross-cultural 
or international level [emphasis added]. The science of negotiation provides 
research evidence to support broad trends that often, but not always, oc-
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cur during the negotiation. The art of negotiation is deciding which strate-
gy to apply when, and choosing which models and perspectives to apply to 
increase cross-cultural understanding. This is especially challenging because cross-
cultural and international negotiations add a level of complexity significantly greater 
than within-culture negotiations [emphasis added]. (p. 443) 
 
 A deep knowledge of the cultures present in a negotiation is a great 
vantage point to reach a final agreement, because its success is not to obtain 
what was initially desired, but to obtain the best result that the pieces in this 
particular game can provide. Aiming at what these pieces can provide, and 
not at particular desires, is more realistic and scientific, and also less frustrat-
ing. It is necessary not to dismiss a single one of the variables involved in the 
game, including the least visible but more present one: culture, the niche 
where beliefs dwell; this is the decisive variable, and, as sugar in the coffee, 
you do not see it but it is there. 
 
 Anyway, the main goal of this work is not whether it reached the de-
sired purpose, but whether the reflections presented open the way to future 
thinking, the gates to future History. The ultimate purpose of this paper is 
to widen the horizon to the scrutiny of those minds which are passionate 
about negotiation. Our last question, dedicated to those who read this far, is: 
 
what do you think, believe…? 
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